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Abstract: The role of international law in regulating international movement in the context of 
global environment change and hazards remains a topic of intense debate among both legal 
scholars and practitioners. Yet, as this article shows, we have largely reached the limits of 
what existing international law methods and approaches can tell us about the future of the 
law in this area. Instead, this article draws on a detailed regional case study to offer a 
distinct perspective to that ongoing debate about the role and future of international law. 
Against the backdrop of emerging patterns of mobility linked to devastating environmental 
disasters in the Americas, it derives a striking set of new legal insights from in-depth analysis 
of a developing body of comparative and international legal practice by countries from 
across this key region. 
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Global society appears ever more conscious of how environmental phenomena shape ‘human 
mobility’.1 The immobility enforced on populations by lockdowns in many countries as a 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic is only the most recent example. Yet environmental 
threats can also help to push the movement of persons. Thus, in the context of climate 
change, the well-publicised risk posed to the ongoing viability of human settlement of small 
islands in the Pacific Ocean by rising sea levels fuels globalised concern that their 
populations will end up as ‘climate refugees’.2 But this long-term ‘sinking’ Pacific island 
scenario is but one of many scenarios where movement is shaped by environmental 
processes. Some reflect hazards that are more sudden-onset in character. For example, in the 
 
1
 The term ‘mobility’ is used here to signal an emphasis on agency in movement, i.e. not only the act of 
movement itself but also the wider capacity to move, and to attempt to avoid importing implicit value judgments 
as to the voluntary or involuntary nature of such movement that are often implicit in the use of terms such as 
‘migration’ or ‘displacement’.  
2
 For a critical perspective, see Carol Farbotko & Heather Lazrus, The First Climate Refugees? Contesting 
Global Narratives of Climate Change in Tuvalu, 22 Global Environmental Change 382 (2012). 
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Americas, as recently as 2017, around 160,000 inhabitants of Puerto Rico fled to the United 
States (U.S.) mainland after the sudden devastation wrought on that island by Hurricane 
Maria, some temporarily and others more permanently.3 Indeed, a diverse range of 
environmental threats generates a far-reaching mobility impact on populations across the 
world. These are global challenges, both in the sense that few countries are immune to their 
effects and also in that such environmental phenomena and their consequences do not respect 
the territorial boundaries claimed by nation states and they are often cross-border in nature. 
The risks posed by environmental phenomena, especially in the context of a process 
of global climate change, have served to prompt attempts by states, civil society and other 
actors to coordinate international action. This includes efforts to develop appropriate 
structures of international law in such fields, respectively, as climate change mitigation and 
adaptation and that of disaster risk management. More recently, normative frameworks in 
each of these fields have begun to directly acknowledge the human mobility dimensions of 
these environmental phenomena. Most prominently, under the 1992 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 2010 Cancun Agreement invites 
states to ‘enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change 
induced displacement, migration and planned relocation’.4 Likewise, in the disaster risk 
management field, the non-binding 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction calls 
on states to address ‘disaster-induced human mobility’, including by ‘transboundary 
cooperation’.5 
Up to this point, the global frameworks calling for cooperation on human mobility 
challenges in the context of environmental threats offer little guidance on the form that such 
responses should take.6 In this regard, a largely ‘blank canvas’ appears to exist, waiting for 
legal development. Yet, as this article will show, a long-standing parallel body of legal 
research and debate seeks to fill this apparently blank canvas. Based on a preoccupation that 
existing international law does not adequately protect people who leave their countries due to 
environmental push factors, particularly those linked to climate change, these international 
law studies already articulate a diverse range of innovative potential solutions to this 
perceived ‘gap’ in the law.7 They are complemented by the small number of extant judicial 
 
3
 Jennifer Hinojosa & Edwin Meléndez, Puerto Rican Exodus: One Year since Hurricane Maria, BRIEFING: 
CENTER FOR PUERTO RICAN STUDIES (Sept. 5, 2018) at https://centropr.hunter.cuny.edu/research/data-
center/research-briefs/puerto-rican-exodus-one-year-hurricane-maria. 
4
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered into force 
Mar. 21, 1994); Decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 14(f), of the Conference of Parties (COP). A Displacement Task 
Force was also created under the UNFCCC Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated 
with Climate Change Impacts in 2015 (Decision 1/CP.21, paragraph 49). Yet, whilst climate-related mobility 
has become increasingly embedded as a topic of concern within the UNFCCC loss and damage mechanism, 
some suggest that its placement there may actually weaken efforts to promote climate-related mobility as a 
standalone issue and to develop consensus on responses, due to the particularities of that mechanism (Chloé 
Anne Vlassopoulos, When Climate-induced Migration Meets Loss and Damage: A Weakening Agenda-setting 
Process?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW 376 
(Benoît Mayer & François Crépeau eds., 2017) and more general concerns about its decreasing prominence 
within the wider UNFCCC process.  
5
 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, at, respectively, paragraph 28(d) and paragraph 30(l). 
Yet, whilst subsequent policy developing this DDR framework acknowledges the number of ‘permanently 
displaced people’ as a potential indicator for the ‘human impact’ and ‘economic impact’ of a disaster, specific 
guidance on measures to respond to such impact remains lacking. See, for example, United Nations Office for 
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), Words into Action Guidelines, 63 (2017). 
6
 See notes 4-5. 
7
 The parallel literature on the mandate and role of institutions at the international level will not be addressed 
here except as it bears on the question of international law development on the status of affected persons. See, 
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decisions that explore how existing international law rules on refugee status and human rights 
protection might apply to such scenarios.8 Overall, this body of scholarly insight and creative 
thinking represents a rich resource for states and other international actors as they consider 
how the global response to human mobility in the context of environmental threats might be 
further developed in the face of evidence that global warming is accelerating rapidly.  
The present study contributes to this topical international law debate by offering a 
new perspective rooted in empirical evidence and legal practice from the region of the 
Americas. It starts by highlighting key features of the existing legal literature on what we 
might call the ‘environment-mobility’ nexus (Part I).9 It shows that most legal studies adopt a 
particular approach, focusing on how international law, usually at the global level, could be 
developed to address a perceived gap in protection for people who displace to other countries 
due to environmental push factors. However, it contends that we have largely reached the 
limits of what that methodology can tell us about the current or future role of law in this area. 
It suggests that studying the legal issues as they play out in practice in one specific region 
provides a useful complementary perspective. Moreover, as a region, the Americas offer a 
useful counterpoint to emerging legal scholarship with a regional focus on sinking islands in 
the Pacific.10 It leads us not only to revisit certain widely-held assumptions in the existing 
legal literature but also to reconsider the likely pathways for future development of 
international law in this field. 
This case study starts by evaluating international mobility linked to environmental 
factors in the Americas to gain a sharper empirical understanding of where exactly the law 
might usefully act in this region (Part II). It then challenges the widely-held assumption that 
    
for example, Sinja Hantscher, THE UNHCR AND DISASTER DISPLACEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 
AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (2019); Nina Hall, DISPLACEMENT, DEVELOPMENT, AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MOVING BEYOND THEIR MANDATES 
(2016); Andrea C. Simonelli, GOVERNING CLIMATE INDUCED MIGRATION AND DISPLACEMENT - 
IGO EXPANSION AND GLOBAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2015); and contributions to 
ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION (Kerstin Rosenow-Williams 
& François Gemenne eds., 2016). 
8
 See, for example, the national judicial decisions on how international refugee law concepts are to be 
interpreted in relation to claims for asylum by persons fleeing climate change or disasters, including the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 and the Supreme Court of 
New Zealand in Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2015] 
NZSC 107. The application of international human rights as protection against refoulement in the context of 
climate change was recently addressed by the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) in Ioane 
Teitiota v. New Zealand, UN Doc CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 (2020). 
9
 Benoît Mayer & François Crépeau, Introduction, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
MIGRATION AND THE LAW 1, 1 (Benoît Mayer & François Crépeau eds., 2017) coined the idea of a 
‘climate-mobility nexus’. That of an ‘environment-mobility nexus’ encapsulates a similar understanding that 
human mobility can be shaped in many different ways, and often indirectly, by environmental factors more 
broadly and not just climate change.  
10
 This study thus develops the relatively sparse legal literature on this topic in the Americas as a region. This 
includes David James Cantor, Cross-border Displacement, Climate Change and Disasters: Latin America and 
the Caribbean, PLATFORM ON DISASTER DISPLACEMENT (2018), at 
https://disasterdisplacement.org/portfolio-item/brazil-declaration-study; Erika Pires Ramos & Fernanda de 
Salles Cavedon-Capdeville, Regional Responses to Climate Change and Migration in Latin America, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW 262 (Benoît Mayer & 
François Crépeau eds., 2017); Nicolás Rodríguez Serna, Human Mobility in the Context of Natural 
Hazardrelated Disasters In South America, NANSEN INITIATIVE (2015), at 
https://www.nanseninitiative.org/central-america-consultations-intergovernmental/; David James Cantor, Law, 
Policy and Practice concerning the Humanitarian Protection of Aliens on a Temporary Basis in the context of 
Disasters, NANSEN INITIATIVE (2015), at https://www.nanseninitiative.org/central-america-consultations-
intergovernmental/. 
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states lack the legal tools to respond to such mobility by illustrating how pertinent provisions 
exist, and are used for that purpose in practice, by many states in the Americas. Crucially, 
such provisions are found less in the law on ‘international protection’ (Part III) than in 
immigration law (Part IV). This analysis of how states actually approach the issue in practice 
is helpful in that it adds an understanding not only of where international rules may be needed 
but also the specific form that they might take. The study also shows how these 
understandings are being actively promoted by intergovernmental bodies at the sub-regional 
level in the Americas (Part V). On the environment-mobility nexus, the findings support the 
view that the international law predicament will be resolved not by producing new legal or 
analytical concepts but by thinking differently about existing concepts (Part VI).11 
I. THE ENVIRONMENT-MOBILITY NEXUS AS A LEGAL PROBLEM 
Legal scholarship is increasingly preoccupied with the challenge posed to human mobility by 
climate change and other environmental factors. Students of international law, in particular, 
have led this debate and most legal studies pursue the enquiry in terms of international law.12 
On its face, the fact that international law is at the core of this research agenda is hardly 
surprising. Indeed, climate change, the environment and human mobility are all global 
phenomena and thus seem appropriate topics for international law. Yet many legal studies are 
rooted in highly particular assumptions about the nature of both the underlying empirical 
phenomena and the resulting legal problem. This Part illustrates these assumptions by 
sketching out some of the main areas of legal debate. In this regard, it does not claim to be a 
comprehensive survey of the burgeoning literature on this topical concern. Rather, it builds 
on critical review of the existing legal scholarship to elucidate where and how a case study of 
the region of the Americas might advance the wider legal debate in this field. 
Understanding the Empirical Phenomenon 
The underlying empirical phenomenon is described using diverse overlapping and often 
competing terms, each loaded with assumptions about how states should respond.13 However, 
‘we should not be distracted by semantic discussions with little practical meaning about 
whether to call affected persons “climate change refugees”, “environmental migrants” or 
something else’.14 Rather, analyses must focus on how the broad nexus between 
‘environment’ and ‘mobility’ is constituted empirically across a range of contexts and forms. 
Although a paucity of robust empirical studies on this nexus was long a cause for concern,15 
 
11
 Calum T.M. Nicholson, ‘Climate-Induced Migration’: Ways Forward in the Face of an Intrinsically 
Equivocal Concept, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW 
49, 50 (Benoît Mayer & François Crépeau eds., 2017). In this sense, it is not a ‘new’ challenge needing ‘new’ 
responses (Étienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud & Paul de Guchteneire, Migration and Climate Change, in 
MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 24 (Étienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud & Paul de Guchteneire eds. 
2011)). 
12
 However, a couple of studies that examine the issue in relation to the national law or policy of one country, 
e.g. Eric Omeziri & Christopher Gore, Temporary Measures: Canadian Refugee Policy and Environmental 
Migration, 29 REFUGE 43 (2014); Chelsea Krombel, The Prospective Role of Temporary Protected Status: 
How Discretionary Designation has Hindered the United States’ Ability to Protect Those Displaced by 
Environmental Disaster, 28 CONN. J. INT’L L. 153 (2012-13). 
13
 Piguet et al., supra note 11, at 17-21. 
14
 Walter Kälin, The Climate Change-Displacement Nexus (Jul. 16, 2008), at https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-
record/the-climate-change-displacement-nexus/. 
15
 Dominic Kniveton, Kerstin Schmidt-Verkerk, Christopher Smith & Richard Black, Climate Change and 
Migration: Improving Methodologies to Estimate Flows, 33 MIGRATION RESEARCH SERIES 1 (2008). 
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the evidence base has begun to expand over the last decade or so.16 In tandem, whilst the 
superficial engagement of many legal scholars with this empirical evidence is regularly 
criticised,17 a growing number are now reflecting more seriously on the empirical research 
and its potentially far-reaching implications for understanding the role of law in this context. 
As a result, several important discussions about the empirical nature of the environment-
mobility nexus can now be discerned as pertinent to shaping the approach and direction of 
legal studies. 
Firstly, on the nature of the nexus between mobility and environmental factors, most 
legal studies frame it in terms of ‘causality’. In other words, the nexus is seen primarily as a 
causal relationship.18 Moreover, in general, these legal studies are concerned with causality in 
one direction only, i.e. environmental change as a cause of movement (although migration as 
a cause of environmental change is also considered by the social sciences).19 Likewise, the 
legal literature focuses squarely on adverse environmental conditions as a ‘push’ factor 
prompting people to leave the country of origin. Especially in the climate change context, it 
frames the resulting mobility as a ‘new’ challenge, although environmental adversity and 
change have probably shaped human mobility throughout history.20 Yet this primary interest 
in how environmental conditions act as a ‘push’ factor for mobility has led legal researchers 
to overlook other pertinent ways in which environmental change can shape the experience of 
human mobility, including as a ‘pull’ factor for migrants (as for example, in places where 
new economic opportunities emerge as a result of certain climate change impacts).21  
Secondly, on the content of this causal nexus, legal scholars often adopt a 
‘maximalist’ or ‘alarmist’ understanding of ‘environmental migration’.22 Rooted in natural 
sciences and security studies, it uses deductive methods to forecast vast future waves of 
migration driven by environmental change.23 The approach posits the nexus in ‘mono-causal’ 
terms, with environmental factors acting as the sole drivers of predicted movement. However, 
empirical evidence from local studies in the social sciences instead points to the ‘multi-
causal’ nature of migration and shows how environmental change is often just one of many 
 
16
 Stephen Castles, Concluding Remarks on the Climate Change-Migration Nexus, in MIGRATION AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE 415, 419-422 (Étienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud & Paul de Guchteneire eds. 2011);  
17
 This critique has been advanced by many scholars within and outside the field, including Benoît Mayer, Who 
Are “Climate Refugees”? Academic Engagement in the Post-truth Era, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND 
THE LEGAL IMPASSE? 89, 94 (Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent eds., 2018); Richard Black, Environmental 
Refugees: Myth or Reality?, 34 NEW ISSUES IN REFUGEE RESEARCH 1 (2001). 
18
 See, more generally, Calum Nicholson, Climate Change and the Politics of Causal Reasoning: The Case of 
Climate Change and Migration, 180 GEORGRAPHICAL J. 151 (2014). 
19
 For instance, see Richard Black, REFUGEES, ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (1998). 
20
 Anthony Penna, THE HUMAN FOOTPRINT: A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 4-8, 56-58, 106-
7 (2nd ed., 2014). Indeed, environmental factors have been recognised by migration theories as early as the 
1880s, although they made a resurgence only in the 1980s after references to them dwindled during much of the 
twentieth century (Étienne Piguet, From “Primitive Migration” to “Climate Refugees”: The Curious Fate of the 
Natural Environment in Migration Studies, 103 ANN. ASSOC. AM. GEOGRAPHERS 148 (2013)). 
21
 Benoît Mayer, THE CONCEPT OF CLIMATE MIGRATION: ADVOCACY AND ITS PROSPECTS 22-25 
(2016). 
22
 See discussion by Gemenne, on which this paragraph draws (François Gemenne, How They Became the 
Human Face of Climate Change: Research and Policy Interactions in the Birth of the “Environmental 
Migration” Concept, in MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 225, 230-239 (Étienne Piguet, Antoine 
Pécoud & Paul de Guchteneire eds. 2011)). 
23
 See, for instance, Norman Myers and Jennifer Kent, ENVIRONMENTAL EXODUS: AN EMERGENT 
CRISIS IN THE GLOBAL ARENA (1995).  
DRAFT: Accepted for publication by Chicago Journal of International Law for Vol. 21(2) 
6

interconnected factors influencing mobility.24 On this basis, ‘sceptical’ or ‘minimalist’ 
scholars have argued that, empirically, environmental factors cannot be isolated as a primary 
driver of movement, questioning whether ‘environmental migration’ really exists as distinct 
phenomenon.25 Others, though, attempt to transcend the divide by analysing environmental 
factors as a ’proximate’ cause of movement that, even if it does interact with other factors, 
may produce distinct forms of mobility, as in circumstances of ‘sudden or extreme’ 
environmental change.26 As the empirical evidence base grows, this approach seems to be 
gaining increasing acceptance.27 
Such debate about the multi-causal nature of migration has crucial implications for 
legal scholarship. Certainly, empirical evidence of the multi-causal reality of movement 
suggests that legal studies that adopt a ‘mono-causal’ understanding of this nexus adopt a 
faulty premise. This matters, because the perception of a gap in legal protection in fact 
emerged from the ‘maximalist’ literature that assumes a distinct class of migrants forced to 
leave their homes as a result of environmental change can be identified for the purpose of 
intervention. However, even for those legal studies that frame environmental factors as but 
one ‘proximate’ cause of movement in this context, this question of how to accommodate the 
multi-causal nature of such mobility persists. On the one hand, it poses the question of just 
how ‘proximate’ such environmental factors need to be in order to be treated as a legally-
significant ‘cause’ of movement. On the other hand, given that vulnerability to environmental 
threats is mediated by social, political and economic factors,28 an important question also 
arises about the extent to which such human factors can or should be accommodated in law.29 
Thirdly, many legal scholars frame the ‘environment’ side of the nexus explicitly in 
terms of ‘climate change’.30 For some, this is a strategic gambit to raise the profile of the 
 
24
 Marion Borderon, Patrick Sakdapolrak, Raya Muttarak, Endale Kebede, Raffaella Pagogna & Eva Sporer, 
Migration Influenced by Environmental Change in Africa: A Systematic Review of Empirical Evidence, 41 
DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH 491 (2019); Stephen Castles, Environmental Change and Forced Migration: 
Making Sense of the Debate, 70 NEW ISSUES IN REFUGEE RESEARCH 1 (2002); JoAnn McGregor, 
Refugees and the Environment, in GEOGRAPHY AND REFUGEES: PATTERNS AND PROCESSES OF 
CHANGE 157 (Richard Black & Robinson eds. 1993)  
25
 See, for instance, Castles, supra note 24; Richard Black, Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality?, 34 NEW 
ISSUES IN REFUGEE RESEARCH 1 (2001); William B. Wood, Ecomigration: Linkages between 
Environmental Change and Migration, in GLOBAL MIGRANTS, GLOBAL REFUGEES 42 (Aristide R. 
Zolberg and Peter Benda eds., 2001). 
26
 See, for example, Astri Suhrke, PRESSURE POINTS: ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION, 
MIGRATION AND CONFLICT (1993); Graeme Hugo, Environmental Concerns and International Migration, 
301 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW 105 (1996). 
27
 Castles, supra note 24, at 419-424; Piguet et al., supra note 11, at 5. 
28
 Robert McLeman, Climate- related Migration and its Linkages to Vulnerability, Adaptation, and Socio-
Economic Inequality: Evidence from Recent Examples, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW 29 (Benoît Mayer & François Crépeau eds., 2017); Mike Hulme, 
Attributing Weather Extremes to “Climate Change”: A Review, 38 PROG. PHYS. GEOGRAPHY 499 (2014); 
Kniveton et al, supra note 15.  
29
 For instance, some scholars have argued that underlying processes of discrimination in the social construction 
of vulnerability raise the prospect that affected persons may have a claim to refugee status. See, for example, 
Matthew Scott, CLIMATE CHANGE, DISASTERS, AND THE REFUGEE CONVENTION (2019); Bruce 
Burson, Environmentally Induced Displacement and the 1951 Refugee Convention: Pathways to Recognition, in 
ENVIRONMENT, FORCED MIGRATION AND SOCIAL VULNERABILITY 3 (Tamer Afifi & Jill Jäger 
eds., 2010). See also note 83 and accompanying text. 
30
 François Gemenne, How They Became the Human Face of Climate Change: Research and Policy Interactions 
in the Birth of the “Environmental Migration” Concept, in MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 225 
(Étienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud & Paul de Guchteneire eds. 2011). 
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issue by linking it to powerful discourses on climate change.31 For others, it is a matter of 
global justice that responsibility for resettling poor people forced out of their homes in the 
global South should fall on the states in the global North that contribute most to global 
warming.32 Yet this approach poses challenges for legal analyses. For instance, global 
warming seems to act on mobility by influencing more ‘proximate’ environmental drivers, 
such as storms, drought or desertification. If it is already difficult to empirically isolate the 
role of such ‘proximate’ environmental factors in pushing migration in any specific case, then 
climate change adds an additional layer of complexity, as it sits one step behind those drivers 
(and two if the link to human activities as a cause of climate change is also to be made).33 
Establishing the respective contribution to climate change of particular states adds a third 
additional layer of complexity.34 Despite these challenges, even some of those scholars who 
recognise the ‘multi-causality’ of migration end up proposing solutions for ‘climate migrants’ 
as if they were a definite and identifiable group of persons.35  
Yet, even if such factual and legal determinations were possible in particular cases, 
this emphasis on ‘climate change’ alone has other conceptual limitations. Indeed, as a ‘push’ 
factor for mobility, it is not clear that the impact of climate-related phenomena that could be 
influenced by global warming differs substantially from that of other environmental 
phenomena, such as volcanoes or earthquakes.36 Moreover, even for climate-related push 
factors such as storms or flooding, it is not obvious how events caused, or exacerbated, by 
climate change can be distinguished, in terms of their impact on human mobility, from those 
that are not.37 For these reasons, some legal studies have instead sought to frame this side of 
the nexus in terms of broader concepts of the ‘environment’.38 Particularly since the late 
2000s, scholars and policymakers have increasingly conceptualised the ‘environment’ side of 
the nexus more broadly in terms of ‘disasters’,39 an approach that obviates many of the flaws 
of focusing solely on ‘climate change’.40 Indeed, ‘disasters’ are widely understood as 
 
31
 Benoît Mayer, THE CONCEPT OF CLIMATE MIGRATION: ADVOCACY AND ITS PROSPECTS 43-47 
(2016). 
32
 Maxine Burkett, Justice and Climate Migration: The Importance of Nomenclature in the Discourse on 
Twenty-First-Century Mobility, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE? 73 (Simon 
Behrman & Avidan Kent eds., 2018); Giovanni Bettini, Sarah Louise Nash & Giovanna Gioli, One Step 
Forward, Two Steps Back? The Fading Contours of (In)Justice in Competing Discourses on Climate Migration, 
2 THE GEOGRAPHIC JOURNAL 348 (2016); François Gemenne, One Good Reason to Speak of ‘Climate 
Refugees’, 49 FORCED MIGRATION REVIEW 70 (2015); Laura Westra, Satvinder Juss & Tullio Scovazzi, 
TOWARDS A REFUGEE ORIENTED RIGHT OF ASYLUM (2015).  
33
 Walter Kälin, Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 81, 85 (Jane McAdam ed., 2010). 
34
 Moreover, even if the contribution of particular states to climate change could be characterised as 
internationally wrongful acts under international law, others argue that the principle of reparation in the law of 
state responsibility does not extend to a duty on responsible states to adopt particular policies in relation to 
climate migration, such as resettlement of affected individuals (Benoít Mayer, Climate Change, Migration and 
the Law of State Responsibility, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND 
THE LAW 238 (Benoît Mayer & François Crépeau eds., 2017). 
35
 As noted by Mayer, supra note 17, at 97. 
36
 Mayer, supra note 21, at 12. 
37
 Mayer, supra note 21, at 26. 
38
 Mayer, supra note 21, at 12-16, argues that, conceptually, ‘climate migration’ is a component of 
‘environmental migration’ and cannot, and should not, be addressed in isolation. This is implicit also in those 
studies that seek to develop international law for the protection of ‘environmentally displaced persons’, 
‘environmental refugees’ or on ‘environmental migration’ (see citations in note 88 below). 
39
 Jane McAdam, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 240 (2012). 
40
 Kälin, supra note 33, at 85. Mayer, supra note 21, at 12-16, argues that, conceptually, ‘climate migration’ is a 
component of ‘environmental migration’ and cannot, and should not, be addressed in isolation. Some raise the 
fear that states have proved resistant to addressing problems framed in terms of climate change (Michel Prieur, 
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encompassing both sudden- and slow-onset events but also as constituted not only by the 
manifestation of hazardous events but also by societal vulnerability to those hazards.41 On 
this approach, climate change remains relevant but takes a background role in causal terms, 
as a process that may exacerbate more immediate climate-related hazards in particular 
contexts.42  
The ‘disaster’ concept usefully foregrounds the more proximate environmental factors 
influencing human mobility. Yet it also raises questions. Crucially, different definitions of the 
‘disaster’ concept exist, despite a similar overall approach.43 Even the widely-used UN 
definition has particularities that need consideration in the mobility context. For instance, 
whilst it recognises that a ‘hazard’ need not have the potential for collective impact,44 it 
requires that a ‘hazardous event’ results in a serious collective impact in order to qualify as a 
‘disaster’.45 But do people really move in response only to ‘disasters’ or also due to 
hazardous events and hazards and, if so, which concept should we favour? Moreover, each 
rendering of the disaster concept also differs in how it classifies different hazards in terms of 
both their ‘origins’46 and ‘types’.47 For our purposes, this may complicate efforts to identify 
    
Towards an International Legal Status of Environmentally Displaced Persons, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: 
BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE? 233, 241 (Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent eds., 2018). 
41
 For instance, UN policy defines a ‘disaster’ as ‘a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a 
society at any scale due to hazardous events interacting with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and capacity, 
leading to one or more of the following: human, material, economic and environmental losses and impacts’. A 
sudden-onset disaster is one ‘triggered by a hazardous event that emerges quickly or unexpectedly’, whilst a 
slow-onset disaster ‘emerges gradually over time’ (see, for example, United Nations General Assembly, Report 
of the Open-ended Intergovernmental Expert Working Group on Indicators and Terminology Relating to 
Disaster Risk Reduction, UN Doc. A/71/644, 13 (2016)). In short, disasters are never solely ‘environmental’ or 
‘natural’ in character but equally reflect societal vulnerabilities to hazards that may be ‘natural’ or ‘man-made’. 
See also Ilan Kelman, DISASTER BY CHOICE: HOW OUR ACTIONS TURN NATURAL HAZARDS INTO 
CATASTROPHES (2020). 
42
 ‘A changing climate leads to changes in the frequency, intensity, spatial extent, duration, and timing of 
extreme weather and climate events, and can result in unprecedented extreme weather and climate events’ (see, 
for example, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, MANAGING THE RISKS OF EXTREME EVENTS 
AND DISASTERS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION 7 (2012)). See also Martine 
Rebetez, The Main Climate Change Forecasts the Might Cause Human Displacements, in MIGRATION AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE 37 (Étienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud & Paul de Guchteneire eds. 2011). 
43
 The different approaches reflect consensus that disasters result from the interaction between hazards and 
societal resilience to them but differ in other material aspects. For instance, compare the widely-endorsed UN 
definition of the ‘disaster’ concept (supra note 41) to that developed by the Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) for its Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), and apparently still used by 
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, which defines a disaster as ‘a situation or 
event which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to a national or international level for external 
assistance; an unforeseen and often sudden event that causes great damage, destruction and human suffering’. 
44
 The UN approach defines a ‘hazard’ as a ‘process, phenomenon or human activity that may cause loss of life, 
injury or other health impacts, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation’ 
(supra note 41, at 18). 
45
 The UN approach defines a ‘hazardous event’ as the ‘manifestation of a hazard in a particular place during a 
particular period of time’ (supra note 41, at 20). 
46
 The UN approach views the origins of hazards as, respectively, ‘natural, anthropogenic or socionatural’, 
locating both environmental degradation and climate change in the last category (supra note 41, at 18). By 
contrast, the CRED approach distinguishes between ‘natural’ and ‘technological or man-made’ hazards, locating 
environmental degradation under the latter, but treating climate change as an ‘aggravating factor’. 
47
 Alongside ‘technological or man-made’ hazards (that include environmental degradation and pollution), the 
CRED approach sub-divides the hazards of ‘natural’ origin into geophysical, hydrological, climatological, 
meteorological and biological types. As noted above, climate change is not treated as a hazard in its own right 
but rather an ‘aggravating factor’. By contrast, the UN approach lists biological, environmental, geological, 
hydrometeorological and technological types of hazard without relating them to particular origins. 
Environmental degradation is listed under ‘environmental hazards’. However, this category is qualified by the 
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which particular hazards are to be treated as ‘environmental’ in character (and whether by 
reference to origins or types).48 Indeed, the most consistent approach may be simply to treat 
all of the identified hazard types as essentially ‘environmental’.49 Lastly, some scholars have 
expressed concern that the ‘disaster’-based approach risks introducing a false binary between 
slow- and sudden-onset events, which might end up privileging more easily-identifiable 
sudden-onset disasters and temporary forms of protection when more durable solutions could 
be required in some situations.50 Such criticisms foreground important questions about 
whether disparate types of hazardous events might impact in different ways on mobility 
decisions or on any resulting patterns of movement and thus point to a need for distinct kinds 
of legal responses.51  
Meanwhile, on the ‘human mobility’ side of the nexus, legal studies tend to privilege 
movement with an international character.52 This mirrors wider public concern, which 
engages mainly with the cross-border aspect of climate and disaster mobility. Yet empirical 
evidence suggests that international movement is a less significant form of mobility in this 
context, in terms of numbers and vulnerability, than internal displacement or enforced 
immobility.53 Many legal studies also seem to assume that movement caused by 
environmental factors will be from global South to North.54 Moreover, they regularly cite the 
    
assertion that many of the processes that fall into it ‘may be termed drivers of hazard and risk rather than 
hazards in themselves, such as soil degradation, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, salinization and sea-level 
rise’ (supra note 41, at 19). A more recent UN document offers a still more diverse typology of hazards as 
geophysical, hydrological, meteorological, climatological, extra-terrestrial, environment degradation, biological 
and technological (UNISDR, Technical Guidance for Monitoring and Reporting on Progress in Achieving the 
Global Targets of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 172-3 (Dec. 2017)).  
48
 In other words, it is necessary to decide how a focus on ‘environmental’ factors maps onto the different 
approaches to classifying hazards. For instance, on the UN approach, is it to be done by origin, in which case 
does the term ‘environmental’ cover only hazards of ‘natural’ origin or also those of ‘socionatural origin’ (or 
even those of ‘anthropogenic’ origin); or by type, in which case, does the term cover all types (‘biological’, 
‘geological’ etc.) or only some (only ‘environmental’, for instance, or ‘not technological’)?  
49
 On the most recent UN approach (supra note 47), this would include geophysical, hydrological, 
meteorological, climatological, extra-terrestrial, environment degradation, biological, and technological hazards. 
However, with reference to the origins of the hazards, the UN approach expressly excludes ‘armed conflict and 
other situations of social instability or tension’ (supra note 41, at 18). 
50
 McAdam, supra note 39, at 247-249; Mayer, supra note 21, at 87-89. 
51
 For discussion of the empirical evidence in relation to the distinct climate-related hazards of (1) storms, rains 
and floods, (2) droughts and desertification, and (3) sea level rise, see Piguet et al., supra note 11, at 6-12 and 
14-16. Indeed, the distinctions between the various forms of migration are not always neat (Graeme Hugo, 
Lessons from Past Forced Resettlement for Climate Change Migration, in MIGRATION AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE 260 (Étienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud & Paul de Guchteneire eds. 2011). 
52
 Piguet et al., supra note 11, at 15. However, some of the ‘solutions’ proposed are extended also to those 
internally displaced by climate change (see, for instance, David Hodgkinson, Tess Burton, Heather Anderson & 
Lucy Young, ‘The Hour When the Ship Comes In’: A Convention for Persons Displaced by Climate Change, 36 
MON. L.R. 69 (2010); Frank Biermann & Ingrid Boas, Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global 
Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees, 10 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 60 (2010)) but 
most legal studies tend to treat internal displacement in this context as adequately addressed by the UN Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement (see note 99). 
53
 On the former, see Khalid Koser, Climate Change and Internal Displacement: Challenges to the Normative 
Framework, in MIGRATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE 289 (Étienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud & Paul de 
Guchteneire eds. 2011). On the latter, the most vulnerable to the effects of climate change often do not have the 
resources to move internationally or even at all. See Dug Cubie, In-Situ Adaptation: Non-Migration as a Coping 
Strategy for Vulnerable Persons, in CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW AND 
POLICY PERSPECTIVES 99 (Dimitra Manou, Andrew Baldwin, Dug Cubie, Anja Mihr & Teresa Thorp eds., 
2017). 
54
 Carol Farbotko, Representation and Misrepresentation of Climate Migrants, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW 67, 70-77 (Benoît Mayer & François Crépeau eds., 
2017); Piguet, et al., supra note 11, at 15; Gemenne, supra note 22, at 231-235).  
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predicament of ‘sinking’ Pacific islands as the archetypal empirical problem scenario for the 
law and, among international environmental lawyers, resettlement of the climate-displaced to 
the global North is often advanced as a solution.55 Much of the legal literature also seems to 
assume that the movement has an essentially ‘forced’ character,56 reflecting its framing of 
environmental change as a ‘push’ factor. Even where the potential for ‘voluntary’ movement 
is acknowledged, the main focus of legal studies remains on responding to the ‘forced’ 
aspects of mobility in this context.57 Similarly, it is well-recognised that we should avoid 
characterising migration merely as a failure to adapt to environmental change, since 
movement is not only a reactive last-resort but can also be a proactive adaptive coping 
strategy.58 
Finally, returning briefly to the intersection between ‘mobility’ and ‘the environment’, 
it is important to acknowledge the recent surge of interest among scholars in how the 
coronavirus pandemic will shape the movement of persons globally.59 In tandem, many 
governments around the world have imposed measures to strictly limit international 
movement into their territories, especially by non-nationals travelling from any territory 
where the virus appears to have been poorly contained.60 On the one hand, the situation in 
2020 is a stark illustration of the fact that the ‘environment-mobility’ nexus can manifest 
itself in diverse forms. On the other hand, it shows that their legal implications may differ. In 
this regard, epidemics and pandemics, as specific kinds of biological hazard, represent 
something of a special case. Given that human mobility within and between states is often 
one of the main vectors by which the hazard is transmitted to new communities, along with 
the attendant risk of disaster, they raise particular sets of questions in the mobility context 
around the legal framework for (exceptional) measures regulating or restricting entry and free 
movement to minimise the transmission of infection.61 Since these legal issues are important 
 
55
 Katrina M. Wyman, Ethical Duties to Climate Migrants, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW 347 (Benoît Mayer & François Crépeau eds., 2017). It is evident too 
in the emphasis on legal proposals for international ‘resettlement’ of climate migrants that seem to presuppose 
the unavailability of internal mobility options (such as that by Biermann & Boas, supra note 52). This may 
reflect wider stereotypes about this issue, as observed by Simonelli, supra note 7, at 23-53. 
56
 As noted by Gemenne, supra note 22, at 253; Piguet et al., supra note 11, at 15.  
57
 See, for example, Kälin, supra note 33, at 96. 
58
 Piguet et al., supra note 11, at 15-16; Richard Black, Stephen R. G. Bennett, Sandy M. Thomas & John R. 
Beddington, Climate Change: Migration as Adaptation, 478 NATURE 447, 449 (2011). 
59
 See, for example, the contributions to the Coronavirus and Mobility Forum hosted by the Centre on 
Migration, Policy, and Society at the University of Oxford, UK at https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/project/the-
coronavirus-and-mobility-forum/ (visited May 26, 2020).  
60
 In the United States, for example, the president issued a proclamation in April 2020 suspending entry into its 
territory for certain immigrants who present risk to the United States labour market during the economic 
recovery following the COVID-19 outbreak (President of the United States of America, Proclamation 10014 
(Apr. 22, 2020) 85 FR 23441, Apr. 27, 2020). Globally, it is reported that ‘nearly all’ states have imposed entry 
restrictions for persons travelling from territories where the virus has become widespread, with some 
temporarily prohibiting the entry of all non-citizens and non-residents. Moreover, ‘nearly all’ states have 
introduced additional health screening procedures at ports of entry, with ‘most’ requiring travellers from 
affected territories to be quarantined for a period of time on entry. Most countries also advise their nationals 
against non-essential international travel or to specific jurisdictions where the outbreak is more severe. See 
Immigration Update: Coronavirus, FRAGOMEN NEWS, May 25, 2020, at 
https://www.fragomen.com/about/news/immigration-update-coronavirus. 
61
 Among the many short legal analyses recently published on this topic see, for example, Adina Ponta, Human 
Rights Law in the Time of the Coronavirus, 24 ASIL INSIGHTS (Apr. 20, 2020) at 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/24/issue/5/human-rights-law-time-coronavirus; Elspeth Guild, EU 
Fundamental Rights, Human Rights and Free Movement in times of Covid19, RLI BLOG, May 21, 2020, at 
https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2020/05/21/eu-fundamental-rights-human-rights-and-free-movement-in-times-of-
covid19/; Bríd Ní Ghráinne, Covid-19, Border Closures, And International Law, May 4, 2020, at 
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in their own right, and separate from those relating generally to the entry and stay of people 
affected by other kinds of hazards, they deserve study in their own right and will not be 
addressed further here.  
Defining the Legal Problem 
Legal debate on the environment-mobility nexus is underpinned by certain assumptions about 
not only the nature of the underlying empirical situation but also the framing of the legal 
problem. This debate assumes the essential legal problem to be that the law does not 
adequately regulate the situation of persons who leave their country due to environmental 
factors, especially climate change. Implicit in that statement are empirical assumptions about 
which parts of the environmental-mobility nexus are important for legal regulation, as 
outlined above. But the way that legal scholarship addresses this perceived gap in the law 
also reflects certain legal assumptions about how that gap in the law is itself constituted and, 
ultimately, resolved. Those assumptions serve both to channel the resulting legal debate in 
particular directions and to eclipse other productive lines of enquiry. By elucidating these 
underpinning premises, we can better understand where and how a case study of the 
Americas might contribute to debate on legal responses to the environment-mobility nexus. 
Firstly, legal scholarship reflects an international law standpoint. Indeed, in essence, 
this is a debate about international law. This focus on international law in particular is hardly 
surprising, since both migration and the environment are intuitively global phenomena. 
Naturally, it seems to follow that international mobility due environmental drivers, as a 
global problem, calls for an international legal response. Yet this conception of the legal 
problem as inherently one of international law shapes the resulting analyses. As the following 
discussion will show, not only is the problem framed as a gap in international law but also 
solutions to this problem are both located within international law and build from existing 
international law.62 Although international law at the global level is the focus of most legal 
studies, growing numbers of legal scholars now argue that new norms of international law are 
more likely to be developed at the regional or even bilateral level, at least in the first 
instance.63 Cooperation of this kind at the regional level is seen as attractive to states since 
most migration is intra-regional in nature already, regions are likely to face similar kinds of 
environmental processes, and regional forms of international cooperation are already the 
status quo in most parts of the world.64 
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https://www.dokumenty-iir.cz/Publikace/Reflections/reflection_Bríd%20Ní_04_2020_covid-19_DEF.pdf. For 
an example from international institutions, see United Nations Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families and United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights 
of Migrants, Joint Guidance Note on the Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Human Rights of Migrants 
(May 26, 2020), at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/CMWSPMJointGuidanceNoteCOVID-
19Migrants.pdf. 
62
 For examples, see notes 83-90 below. 
63
 PDD, State-led, Regional Consultative Processes: Opportunities to Develop Legal Frameworks on Disaster 
Displacement, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE? 126 (Simon Behrman & 
Avidan Kent eds., 2018); Karoline Popp, Regional Policy Perspectives, in PEOPLE ON THE MOVE IN A 
CHANGING CLIMATE 230 (Étienne Piguet and Frank Laczko eds., 2014); Philippe Boncour & Bruce Burson, 
Climate Change and Migration in the South Pacific Region: Policy Perspectives, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
MIGRATION: SOUTH PACIFIC PERSPECTIVES 5, 22 (Bruce Burson ed., 2010); Vikram Kolmannskog & 
Finn Myrstad, Environmental Displacement in European Asylum Law, 11 E.J.M.L. 313 (2009); Angela 
Williams, Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees in International Law, 30 LAW AND 
POLICY 502 (2008). 
64
 Popp, supra note 64, at 230; see also Black et al, supra note 58, at 449. 
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By contrast, law at the national level is seen as largely irrelevant by the legal 
literature. Even scholars who assess the few national law provisions on environmental 
displacement ultimately dismiss them as ‘ad hoc’ and ‘inadequate’,65 ‘unpredictable’ in terms 
of application and status,66 and full of ‘vague language’.67 Such national law is further 
characterised as ‘inconsistent’ and ‘varying from one country to another’.68 It is also said to 
lack ‘legal certainty’, as it is ‘not rooted in existing legal duties’ but relies on ‘discretion 
rather than legal obligation'.69 Of course, many of these complaints about vague language, 
inconsistency and so on appear overstated since they could be levelled equally at 
international law. Likewise, the notion that national law cannot create legal rules and duties 
for the state concerned is simply incorrect. Moreover, it is notable that most scholars simply 
cite the same few protection provisions of national law from states in the global North.70 As a 
result, national law from states in the global South is largely absent from the analysis.71 
Furthermore, the focus in these analyses on ‘international protection’ provisions means that 
the wider provisions of national immigration law are also largely overlooked.72 This is a 
direct consequence of setting the legal debate so firmly within international law parameters: 
in contrast to the law on ‘international protection’, immigration law is not yet well-
established as a distinct body of international law. 
Secondly, the perception of a gap in international law is the starting point for most 
legal studies. It is clear that, in general, persons displaced across borders by environmental 
factors do not benefit from international legal guarantees relating to ‘refugees’ (or those on 
‘migrant workers’).73 Certainly, the extant treaties dealing, respectively, with refugees, 
statelessness, human rights or the environment do not specifically address this situation.74 
Many legal scholars seem to take this fact as sufficient evidence of a legal gap in relation to 
the ‘protection’ of such persons (and thus also, by extension, of a gap in relation to their 
 
65
 Christel Cournil, The Protection of “Environmental Refugees” in International Law, in MIGRATION AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE 359, 369-70 (Étienne Piguet, Antoine Pécoud & Paul de Guchteneire eds. 2011); Thekli 
Anastasiou, Public International Law’s Applicability to Migration as Adaptation, in CLIMATE REFUGEES: 
BEYOND THE LEGAL IMPASSE? 172, 183-184 (Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent eds., 2018). 
66
 McAdam, supra note 39, at 117. 
67
 Anastasiou, supra note 65, at 183-4. 
68
 Kälin, supra note 33, at 100; McAdam, supra note 39, at 117.  
69
 Susan F. Martin, Towards an Extension of Complementary Protection?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW 449, 449-50 (Benoît Mayer & François Crépeau eds., 
2017); Anastasiou, supra note 65, at 183-4. 
70
 This usually includes one or more of the following provisions: Temporary Protected Status in the United 
States; subsidiary protection provisions in Sweden (Aliens Act, SFS 2005: 716, Ch. 4, s. 2, para. 3) and Finland 
(Aliens Act, Act No. 301/2004, Apr. 30, 2004, s. 109(1)); the European Union Temporary Protection Directive 
(as a tool for harmonising national law); and, sometimes, temporary suspensions of removals such as those 
applied in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake (see, for instance, Mayer & Crépeau, supra note 9, at 12; 
Martin, 2017, supra note 69, at 461-4; Vikram Kolmannskog & Lisetta Trebbi, Climate Change, Natural 
Disasters, and Displacement: A Multi-Track Approach to Filling the Protection Gaps, 92(879) I.R.R.C. 713, 
727-8 (2010)). A somewhat wider range of provisions is cited by McAdam, supra note 39, at 99-118. 
71
 This may partly reflect the perception that the global North will be the recipient of arrivals in this context. As 
an exception, see the few counter examples from Africa and one from Argentina cited in passing by McAdam, 
supra note 39, at 107. 
72
 For exceptions, see text at note 97 below. 
73
 See, among many, Walter Kälin & Nina Schrepfer, Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of 
Climate Change: Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches, UNHCR LEGAL AND PROTECTION POLICY 
RESEARCH SERIES (2012); Christel Cournil, Vers une reconnaissance des ‘réfugiés écologiques’? Quelle(s) 
protection(s), quell(s) statut(s)?, 4 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 1035 (2006) 
74
 Ibid. See also the discussion in McAdam, supra note 39, at 39-98. McAdam equally dismisses the much-
debated prospect of the international law on statelessness resolving the situation of ‘sinking’ small island states 
(ibid, at 119-160). 
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envisaged need for ‘resettlement’ to the global North). However, some scholars argue for a 
narrower gap that exists only in respect of certain specific needs that are not covered by 
international human rights law, which continues to benefit such persons.75 In particular, they 
argue that the general gap in legal protection actually exists mainly in relation to the ‘legal 
status’ of these persons and aspects of their ‘admission [and] continued stay [in the reception 
country] and protection against forcible return to the country of origin’.76 
Among legal scholars, the gap in legal standards also tends to be perceived in terms of 
an absence of ‘international protection’ for persons who flee their countries due solely to the 
impact of environmental factors.77 This analogy with the situation of refugees (and other 
beneficiaries of international protection) is evident from the literature’s principal concern 
with persons unwillingly outside their country, recalling the ‘exilic bias’ of refugee law.78 
Some scholars even explicitly frame the legal problem in this context as an absence of 
international protection for ‘forced’ movements, with ‘voluntary migration’ simply left to the 
discretion of states in national law.79 Yet those scholars not only underestimate the difficulty 
of distinguishing ‘forced’ and ‘voluntary’ movement in this context,80 but also misrepresent 
the logic of international protection, which turns on prospective risk in the country of origin 
and a lack of national protection rather than the supposedly ‘forced’ quality of movement.81 
Even so, they show that, analogous to the situation of refugees, the legal gap in relation to 
mobility on environmental grounds is conceived principally as one of ‘international 
protection’ under international law. 
Thirdly, the legal debate is ‘not about the law as it exists (lex lata) but about the law 
as it should be (lex ferenda)’,82 i.e. the problem is largely accepted and the debate is really 
about solutions. In most cases, legal scholars turn to international law to close this legal gap. 
Two main methods are evident. Thus, certain scholars, particularly those from the 
international refugee and human rights law fields, argue in favour of more expansively 
interpreting existing norms of international law. Many of them advocate for interpreting 
international refugee definitions broadly to properly take account of how ‘human’ inputs also 
shape ‘natural’ disasters in any particular society.83 Some also propose the development of 
 
75
 Kälin, supra note 33, at 87-89. See also Siobhán McInerney-Lankford, Climate Change, Human Rights and 
Migration: A Legal Analysis of Challenges and Opportunities, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, MIGRATION AND THE LAW 131 (Benoît Mayer & François Crépeau eds., 2017). 
76
 PDD, supra note 63 at 145; Kälin, supra note 33, at 89. The recent comments of the UNHRC in Teitiota v. 
New Zealand, supra note 8, paras. 9.11-9.14 suggest that, in principle, the effects of climate change (and 
possibly other forms of environmental degradation) in an applicant’s country of origin could generate a 
sufficient threat to the right to life to prevent refoulement on human rights grounds, although that threat would 
have to be highly imminent. It would also not require states to grant admission or stay.  
77
 McAdam, supra note 39, at 36.  
78
 Gervase J.L. Coles, The Human Rights Approach to the Solution of the Refugee Problem: A Theoretical and 
Practical Enquiry, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 195, 209 (Alan E. Nash ed., 1988). 
79
 Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 73, at 62; Kälin, supra note 33, at 89-90 and 95-96. 
80
 This reflects the complex intermingling of environmental and human factors, including adaptation strategies 
and coping mechanisms, especially in the face of slow-onset processes (see note 24 above). 
81
 McAdam, supra note 39, at 98; McGregor, supra note 24. 
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soft law instruments to provide temporary or similar protection to the broader class of persons 
fleeing environmental factors.84 Such proposals, often touted as merely a first step on the path 
to creating a dedicated new treaty on this challenge, also often creatively draw on, and 
develop, existing international law principles from the field of international protection law.85 
An alternative approach, more common among international environmental law 
scholars, proposes new treaty law to fill the legal gap. A few argue for amending the terms of 
existing treaties in the refugee field,86 although the idea is rightly dismissed by refugee law 
authorities as unworkable.87 Many others call for a new treaty, either standalone or under the 
framework of international environmental law, for which they provide draft proposals.88 At 
their core, though, these proposals seek to promote status-based forms of international 
protection for their respective classes of refugee-like beneficiaries,89 whether they are defined 
in the draft instruments as, variously, ‘environmentally displaced persons’, ‘climate 
migrants’, ‘persons displaced by climate change’ or ‘climate refugees’. Likewise, many of 
the new obligations that these proposals envisage in areas such as ‘resettlement’ and 
‘distribution’ serve to reproduce or develop existing legal principles drawn from the law of 
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international protection or from international environmental law.90 None of the proposals 
have yet been taken up by states.91 
Finally, as no clear ethical basis exists for privileging environmental factors over 
drivers of migration such as poverty, there is debate over whether such special protection can 
be justified.92 Rather than arbitrarily creating new regimes for a privileged few, some suggest 
that we should instead focus on fully promoting the basic human rights of all migrants 
without distinction.93 Similarly, recognition of the way that environmental and human factors 
intertwine to shape vulnerability and mobility leads some to argue that a focus on protecting 
the displaced misses the bigger picture ‘that such migration is a consequence of the human 
insecurity imposed on the South in the current global order’.94 These approaches suggest that 
mobility in this context cannot be addressed in isolation from the pressing need to respond to 
wider migration, environmental and development challenges.95 For instance, certain scholars 
working in the Pacific have begun to analyse climate mobility in the context of wider 
migration patterns and processes.96 As a result, they now argue that climate migration might 
be addressed ‘within existing international migration mechanisms’,97 and ask how 
immigration law in Australia and New Zealand could be tweaked or bilateral or regional 
arrangements developed to accommodate future mobility linked to climate change.98 
Framing the Case Study of the Americas 
Legal debate on the environment-mobility nexus revolves principally around the question of 
how to respond to international mobility shaped by environmental factors. As such, this study 
aims to contribute to that core legal debate rather than considering the legal implications of 
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other aspects of this nexus, such as internal mobility linked to environmental factors.99 
Nonetheless, the study draws on insights from the preceding literature review as points of 
entry into the legal debate. Firstly, on the ‘mobility’ side of the nexus, it focuses on travel, 
entry and stay for aliens as the key challenge. Secondly, on the ‘environment’ side of the 
nexus, it focuses broadly on disasters and the underlying hazards rather than limiting the 
analysis to climate change alone. Thirdly, on causality, it addresses not only how such 
environmental factors contribute to displacement but also how they might impact on 
international mobility in other ways. This provides a strong foundation for renewed 
consideration of key areas of legal debate, such as the scope of existing legal protection, the 
nature of potential legal development in this field, and how to accommodate the multi-causal 
nature of migration. 
The study interrogates these questions through a case study of the Americas. On the 
one hand, this reflects the contention that abstract analysis of international law at the global 
level has largely reached the limits of what it can contribute to advancing these kinds of legal 
debates. On the other hand, it takes seriously the observation by some scholars that 
international mobility linked to environmental factors, as well as the development of legal 
responses and cooperation by states, is most likely in practice to play out within particular 
regions rather than at the global level, at least initially. As a case study, the Americas offer a 
contrasting example to the oft-cited Pacific case.100 Certainly, like the Pacific, countries in the 
Americas are exposed regularly to sundry hazards and are also home to significant 
populations of indigenous peoples. Yet, in other ways, the Americas are more diverse, 
comprising two continents with extensive land borders, as well as the small island states that 
make up most of the Pacific. Moreover, the Americas are 20 times more populous than the 
Pacific and contain not only some of the world’s largest and richest countries but also some 
of its poorest, as well as many others located in between these two extremes. 
II. EMPIRICAL DYNAMICS IN THE AMERICAS 
The gaps in protection identified by legal scholars writing on the environment-mobility nexus 
exist only in relation to the presumed reality of international movement caused by 
environmental threats in the country of origin. In other words, the legal problem corresponds 
to an assumed underlying empirical phenomenon. Yet many legal scholars seem merely to 
rely on vague and poorly-evidenced, even rather speculative, assertions about its existence, 
scope and nature, often citing disjointed and rather particular examples as if they 
demonstrated some general trend.101 However, if we want truly to assess the adequacy of the 
law in relation to specific empirical phenomena, such as the international movement of 
persons in the context of environmental push factors, then we need to engage more robustly 
with the growing body of natural and social science research on this topic.102 Toward this 
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end, the present study seeks to derive a more precise understanding of the environment-
mobility nexus in the region of the Americas from the somewhat fragmentary research that 
exists thus far. From this point of entry, the study elucidates a few of the main ways in which 
disasters and hazards appear, firstly, to act as a push factor for diverse dynamics of 
international  
movement in the Americas and , secondly, to shape the experience of international mobility 
in other ways that are important for the law to consider. 
International Movement Linked to Environmental Threats in the Americas 
Empirical research confirms that the diverse environmental threats to which countries in the 
Americas are exposed can act as a push factor for movement. Evidence of this impact exists 
for both sudden-onset events, such as storms, hurricanes, flooding and earthquakes, and slow-
onset events, such as drought, erosion, desertification and glacier retreat that may be linked to 
climate change.103 Social scientists have suggested that these different kinds of hazards 
produce distinct patterns of mobility in terms of duration, distance and character, although the 
evidence remains somewhat mixed.104 Even so, the data is clear that sudden- and slow-onset 
disasters now push millions of incidents of internal movement by individuals in the countries 
of the Americas each year.105 By contrast, data on international movement due to disasters are 
more fragmentary and not routinely collected. Yet as the following discussion shows, 
international movement linked to both slow- and sudden-onset events in this region is a 
present reality and not just an abstract legal concern, even if its scale seems rather less 
significant than that of internal movement.106 Of course, given that the latter is predicted to 
rise with time,107 so may the former. These trends in the Americas accord with those in other 
regions of the world,108 suggesting that this region is not an anomaly in that respect.  
As in other regions, such mobility is shaped by multiple, intersecting drivers, with 
environmental pressures often just one more push factor in contexts sometimes riven by deep 
inequality.109 Even so, empirical evidence from the Americas suggests that at least three 
different strands of international movement pushed by environmental factors can be 
discerned. The most visible form of movement takes place shortly before or after a sudden-
onset hazardous event is perceived as approaching, as people living near land borders may 
temporarily cross into the neighbouring country to escape the impact of the event or to access 
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better shelter or aid on the other side of the border. It usually follows existing well-
established patterns of daily back-and-forth migratory crossings in border regions. Examples 
include north Guatemalans crossing to Mexico to better weather tropical storms, victims of 
flooding seeking respite by crossing from south Colombia to Ecuador or from Amazonian 
Bolivia and Peru to Brazil, and Chileans affected by earthquakes or mudslides in frontier 
zones that are cut off from other parts of Chile instead seeking aid in accessible Argentinian 
towns.110 Crucially, most people move temporarily to escape not only actual disasters but also 
perceived oncoming disasters or hazardous events. 
Another strand of international movement in the Americas consists of those persons 
who leave their countries in the context of slow-onset disasters. The data shows that these 
persons, who are often from populations or social sectors whose livelihood depends on 
particular forms of agriculture, also tend to follow existing migration routes out of the 
country. For example, severe droughts linked to climatic factors are shown to increase 
migration from affected parts of rural Mexico to the U.S.111 Similarly, slow-onset events 
linked to changing weather and rainfall patterns, soil erosion and other environmental 
degradation appear to have helped push migration from rural parts of the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti, sometimes to other countries.112 Given that the impact of such slow-onset 
disasters is often mediated via social factors to a greater extent than for sudden-onset events, 
their role in driving mobility can be highly contextual.113 However, it is not always possible 
to differentiate the respective contribution of slow- and sudden-onset events to pushing 
movement, especially in locations where they overlap. For instance, research in some rural 
areas of Honduras and Haiti shows how international out-migration is driven by spiralling 
livelihood pressures resulting from the combined impact of slow-onset environmental 
degradation with sudden-onset tropical storms.114  
Similar questions about how to frame the impact of disasters and hazards as a push 
factor for mobility emerge in evidence of a third form of international movement in the 
Americas that takes place up to a year or more after a sudden-onset disaster has occurred. 
This ‘delayed’ movement seems to be driven not so much by the hazard’s sudden and 
immediate disaster impact as by its enduring implications for the viability of long-term 
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household livelihood plans.115 It is documented mainly in poorer and less-resilient Central 
American and Caribbean countries where a tropical storm or earthquake has had a 
particularly devastating effect on society and infrastructure at the national level.116 That data 
dovetails with other research showing that regular migration to the United States increases 
after severe storms in these countries, and also in Mexico, albeit only after a lag period of up 
to a year.117 Like the other two strands of movement, this one also tends to follow traditional 
migration routes from the affected country.118 However, where they are blocked, then it 
seems that new ones are forged, as with the new patterns of Haitian mobility that reoriented 
toward South American countries when some traditional Haitian migration destination 
countries tried to close their borders after the 2010 earthquake.119  
This growing evidence base shows that environmental phenomena in the Americas do 
contribute to pushing diverse forms of international movement. Indeed, the three strands of 
movement identified here likely provide only a few pertinent examples of how the wider 
mobility dynamics play out.120 Certainly, it seems that only in rare cases will these forms of 
movement be likely to satisfy the long-established notions legal bases for international 
protection by states.121 Equally, though, they do suggest that, whilst framing the empirical 
problem in terms of ‘disasters’ offers a useful point of entry for understanding how 
environmental factors influence human mobility, a limitation of the ‘disaster’ concept is that 
it describes only one way in which hazards can act as drivers of mobility. In this regard, the 
examples imply that people do not leave only due to the occurrence or risk of disasters at 
societal level.122 Rather, some movement also occurs pre-emptively due to the perceived 
potential impact of a hazard at the individual or household level, regardless of whether its 
collective impact at the societal level will result in a ‘disaster’. Likewise, other patterns of 
movement occur after the ‘disaster’ phase has passed, due to the hazard’s perceived longer-
term or ongoing impact on the viability of individual or household livelihood strategies. In 
other words, whilst a hazardous event is a prerequisite for a ‘disaster’, the perceived or actual 
impact of a hazard or hazardous event at the household level can be sufficient to drive 
movement by the affected people, even in the absence of disaster conditions at the societal 
level.  
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These three strands of movement also suggest that any analytical distinction between 
sudden- and slow-onset disasters may prove less relevant for our purposes than the 
recognition that hazardous events and disasters can have both short-term and longer-term 
impacts on mobility at the household level, even if their relative proximity as push factors for 
mobility may diminish over the longer-term. In general, then, these conclusions point to a 
need for researchers to focus on the broader ways in which hazards impact on mobility, with 
‘disasters’ but one way in which hazards can shape movement. But what does this mean for 
the law? Certainly, the ‘disaster’ concept was not designed to be applied as a legal basis for 
regulating movement. At the same time, it has definite advantages over concepts such as 
‘climate change’ or ‘the environment’ that suggest its application to this legal context merits 
consideration. As a potential basis for regulating entry and stay by non-nationals, though, the 
empirical evidence suggests that law-makers will need to reflect carefully on whether to use 
the concept of ‘disasters’ strictly as a threshold that requires that a hazard has an impact at the 
collective level in the affected country or instead to advance a more granular approach to the 
wider ways in which ‘hazardous events’ or the underlying ‘hazards’ impact on mobility 
options at the individual or household level. 
Other Forms of Environmental Impact on International Mobility 
The legal literature is principally concerned with environmental factors as a driver of 
international mobility or ‘push factor’. It is recognised that this causality can play out in 
diverse scenarios – for instance, as a result of sudden-onset disasters, slow-onset disasters, the 
impact of climate on conflict over natural resources etc. – but the emphasis remains on how 
such phenomena act as drivers for movement by affected persons.123 More recently, though, 
some legal scholars have argued in favour of a broader conception of this causal nexus by 
pointing to the possibility that environmental factors also might shape mobility by acting as a 
‘pull’ factor due to the new opportunities created by climate change or by mitigation or 
adaptation activities.124 Building on those analyses, the present study contends that 
engagement with the empirical evidence from the Americas discloses still other ways in 
which disasters may shape the phenomenon of international mobility. Moreover, these further 
configurations of the environment-mobility nexus pose particularly acute questions for the 
law, especially in relation to travel, entry and stay for affected persons. 
Certainly, the evidence from the Americas confirms that not all international mobility 
in the context of environmental threats will take the form of a spontaneous movement by 
affected persons. In the Pacific region, scholars have long debated the prospect of inhabitants 
of ‘sinking’ small island states being relocated to other countries and the legal implications of 
such measures.125 However, data from the Americas verifies that organised transfers of 
disaster-affected persons by states already take place in the form of evacuations carried out 
before or shortly after a sudden-onset disaster.126 Such evacuations are often undertaken by a 
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 See, for example, Kälin, supra note 33, at 84-92. 
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 Mayer, supra note 21, at 22-25. 
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 See, for example, Bruce Burson, Walter Kälin, Jane McAdam & Sanjula Weerasinghe, The Duty to Move 
People Out of Harm’s Way in the Context of Climate Change and Disasters, 37 REFUGEE SURVEY 
QUARTERLY 379 (2018); Jane McAdam & Elizabeth Ferris, Planned Relocations in the Context of Climate 
Change: Unpacking the Legal and Conceptual Issues, 4 C.J.I.C.L. 137 (2015). 
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 Evacuations can also involve internal movement, as with the 2017 precautionary wholesale mandatory 
evacuation by Antigua and Barbuda of the island of Barbuda and by the Bahamas of its southern islands. See 
Kate Lyons, The Night Barbuda Died: How Hurricane Irma Created a Caribbean Ghost Town, THE 
GUARDIAN, Nov. 20, 2017; - , Bahamas to Evacuate Islands in path of “Irma”, ASSOC. PRESS, Sep. 6, 
2017. 
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foreign state for those of its nationals unfortunate enough to be caught up in a serious disaster 
overseas. However, in the Americas, empirical data shows that nationals of the disaster-
affected country have sometimes also been evacuated to other countries by those states. 
Examples include the evacuations of the population of Montserrat when the volcano erupted 
in 1995 and certain profiles of Haitian nationals evacuated on medical or similar grounds 
after the 2010 earthquake by Canada, Mexico and the United States.127 This raises the 
question of how the law treats such organised transfers in terms of travel, entry and stay.  
Crucially, studies of the Americas region show that disasters can impact on a range of 
other legal aspects of international mobility for aliens.128 Thus, where a disaster occurs in the 
country of origin, it may limit possibilities for return, whether voluntary or enforced, with 
particular legal implications in terms of removal and stay for nationals of that country. It may 
also reduce the flow of resources from family or businesses in the home country that are 
needed for the alien to support maintenance during studies or other lawful forms of stay in the 
host country. Likewise, where a disaster occurs in the host country, it may also impede the 
alien’s basis for stay as a result of the death of the family member on whom legal status 
depends, the destruction of the business that provides the basis for a work permit or an 
inability to comply with immigration reporting restrictions due to damage to transport and 
communication infrastructures in the host country. The disaster may also reduce or interrupt 
the capacity of immigration authorities in the host country to process applications from aliens 
for travel, entry and stay. Overall, these scenarios suggest that the law needs to take a broader 
conception of the environment-mobility nexus if it is to adequately regulate international 
mobility in the context of environmental threats.  
III. INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION LAW IN THE AMERICAS 
International law scholarship treats international mobility in the context of environmental 
pressures as a new challenge that the existing law does not yet adequately address. Moreover, 
most contributors to this debate frame that legal gap, and its solution, principally in terms of 
international protection for affected persons. At first glance, recent practice in the Americas 
appears to confirm this point. Certainly, states rarely extend international protection to 
persons fleeing environmental threats, despite claims by scholars as to the relevance of 
certain regional legal instruments. Yet, a detailed analysis of legal practice in this region 
offers a more nuanced understanding. Crucially, it shows that states have actually long 
recognised the challenge of international mobility caused by disasters and, initially at least, 
dealt with it as a matter of refugee protection. Further, although this international protection 
approach waned as states in the Americas increasingly became integrated into the global 
refugee law regime, the underlying legal challenge was not discounted. Rather, a distinct new 
legal approach toward the entry and stay of persons affected by a disaster can be discerned in 
some of the national laws on refugees and ‘protection’ adopted by states in the Americas. 
Disasters and International Protection 
At present, most states in the Americas are parties to the main UN treaties on refugee 
protection and have incorporated pertinent aspects of their ‘universal’ refugee definition into 
national law.129 In Latin America, fifteen states have also incorporated the ‘regional’ 
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 Cantor, 2015, supra note 10, at 13. 
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 Examples drawn from Cantor, 2015, supra note 10, at 13-14. 
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 This defines a ‘refugee’ positively as any person who ‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
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expanded refugee definition endorsed by the Cartagena Declaration into their national law.130 
In a small number of states, national law also provides for ‘complementary’ forms of 
international protection based on non-refoulement standards in international human rights 
treaties.131 Some legal scholars argue that these universal and regional treaty norms could be 
interpreted to provide international protection to persons fleeing disasters.132 Some limited 
practice exists in support of this proposal. Thus, after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, several 
Latin American states did recognise a small number of Haitians as ‘refugees’ due to the 
violence unleashed by the disaster.133 Similarly, the French territories of the Antilles and 
Guiana granted ‘subsidiary’ forms of complementary international protection to some Haitian 
asylum-seekers in light of the security and other risks generated by the earthquake.134 
Crucially, though, in each case where states in the Americas did grant international 
protection, whether under refugee law or complementary forms of international protection, 
this was conferred due to the breakdown in the institutions of national protection in Haiti and 
associated risks of violence generated by the disaster. The fact that such violence and the lack 
of national protection resulted from a disaster, as opposed to some other cause, was thus 
treated as legally irrelevant for the purposes of determining international protection. In fact, 
as a matter of national law, almost no state in the Americas treats a disaster as, in itself, a 
basis for international protection under ‘universal’ or ‘regional’ refugee definitions at the 
international level.135 Indeed, in some states, national law expressly rules out such an 
interpretation.136 In practice, certain states have even gone so far as to channel asylum claims 
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that country’. See Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,189 UNTS 150, Art. 1A(2) 
(entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention); Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
Jan. 31,1967,19 UST 6223,606 UNTS 267, Art. 1(2) (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter Protocol]. 
The Caribbean is the exception in this region: only eight of 13 states are parties to the Protocol but only four 
have incorporated the refugee definition into national law and policy (Cantor, 2018, supra note 10, at 64). 
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 This defines ‘refugees’ also as ‘persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom 
have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human 
rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order’. Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, 
Nov. 1984, Conclusion 3, reprinted in 2 UNHCR, COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
AND OTHER LEGAL TEXTS CONCERNING REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS: REGIONAL 
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Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, 
Peru and Uruguay incorporate the expanded definition in national legislation and Costa Rica applies it in 
national law by order of the courts. 
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 International human rights law prohibitions on refoulement to a territory where the risk of torture exists form 
the main source of ‘complementary’ obligations to those expressed by refugee law. In the Americas, national 
law in countries such as Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico and the United States mostly 
reflects the standards expressed by the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 UNTS 85, Art. 3 (entered into force June 26, 1987). See Cantor, 
2018, supra note 10, at 41 and 52-53. 
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 See, for example, Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 73, at 34, who argue that the Cartagena Declaration 
definition may accommodate disaster-affected persons under the element relating to ‘other circumstances which 
have seriously disturbed public order’.  
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 Mexico, Panama, Ecuador and Peru recognised some Haitians as refugees under the definitions provided by 
one or other instrument based on the rise in insecurity in Haiti resulting from the 2010 earthquake (Cantor, 
2015, supra note 10, at 17-18). 
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 Cedric Audebert, The Recent Geodynamics of Haitian Migration in the Americas: Refugees or Economic 
Migrants?, 34 REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE ESTUDOS DE POPULAÇÃO 55, 61 (2017). The ‘subsidiary 
protection’ provided under European Union law is based ultimately on the non-refoulement protection provided 
by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
ETS No. 5, Art 3 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953), to which France is also a party. 
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 Cuba is the exception to this consensus. See text at note 139 and following. 
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 For example, Mexico expressly interprets the ‘other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public 
order’ element of the Cartagena Declaration refugee definition as applicable only to ‘acts attributable to man’. 
DRAFT: Accepted for publication by Chicago Journal of International Law for Vol. 21(2) 
23

by nationals of a disaster-affected country out of the international protection procedures so 
they can be resolved instead under other legal provisions unrelated to international 
protection.137 Thus, states in this region tend not to view persons fleeing a disaster as 
requiring international protection, except in certain specific cases where its impact includes 
clear risks of persecution or violence that fit with existing concepts of international 
protection. The fact of the disaster itself, though, is treated as legally irrelevant to 
determining international protection. 
On its face, the current approach might seem to confirm the presumption that law in 
the Americas has yet to get to terms with the challenge of international mobility linked to 
environmental threats. However, a retrospective analysis of legal practice in this region 
shows that states have not always taken this approach to the application of international 
protection law. Indeed, between 1952 and 1980, national law in the United States expressly 
provided for different categories of ‘persons uprooted by catastrophic natural calamity’ to be 
resettled to the United States as ‘refugees’.138 Moreover, during this early period, the United 
States was not alone in viewing the challenge of persons displaced by disasters as a matter of 
refugee protection. For instance, in 1978, Cuba adopted a definition of refugees as including, 
inter alia, persons who leave their country ‘due to cataclysm or other phenomena of 
nature’.139 In 1979, the government of Trinidad and Tobago also contemplated the challenge 
of ‘refugees from natural disasters’ and decided that such cases ‘be decided, when the need 
arises, on the basis of the circumstances prevailing in Trinidad and Tobago at the particular 
period in time’.140  
These examples show that, contrary to the assumption by some legal scholars that 
international mobility linked to environmental threats represents a new legal gap, this 
challenge has long been recognised in the practice of certain states in the Americas. Indeed, 
the initial approach of those states to legally resolving the challenge by adopting unilateral 
and sui generis refugee definitions in national law waned only during the 1980s, as states 
across the Americas increasingly joined the UN refugee treaties and incorporated their 
‘universal’ refugee definition in national law. As a result, in this region today, the earlier 
approach persists solely in Cuba, which remains outside the UN refugee treaty regime. The 
role played by international law in this shift in approach is noteworthy. In this instance, 
whereas the legal scholarship usually envisages a positive role for international law in 
extending international protection to persons fleeing disaster contexts, here it appears to have 
curtailed the protection available to such persons under existing national law and thus helped 
create a ‘gap’ as a result of promoting the harmonisation of national law with UN refugee 
treaty law. Although this observation cannot be generalised beyond these specific examples, 
it calls us to think more critically about the relationship between national and international 
law in responding to this challenge.  
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See Reglamento de la Ley sobre Refugiados y Protección Complementaria, Art. 4(XI) (Feb. 16, 2012), at 
www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/regley/Reg_LRPC.pdf, Mexico). 
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 See for example, the Brazilian procedural response to Haitian asylum-seekers after the earthquake (Sanjula 
Weerasinghe, In Harm's Way: International Protection in the Context of Nexus Dynamics Between Conflict or 
Violence and Disaster or Climate Change, 39 UNHCR LEGAL AND PROTECTION POLICY RESEARCH 
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Study on U.S. Policy Options for Post-Earthquake Haiti, 255 CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 
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 Decreto (Decree) No. 26, Art. 80 (Jul. 19, 1978), available at http://juriscuba.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/Ley-migracion.reglamento-actualizada-2012.pdf, Cuba.  
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An Alternative Legal Approach 
From the 1990s, an alternative legal approach to the challenge of international mobility 
linked to environmental threats can be discerned in the broader ‘international protection’ 
practice of certain states in the Americas. The creation of ‘temporary protected status’ (TPS) 
in the national law of the United States offers one prominent example. Indeed, legal 
scholarship routinely cites the ‘environmental disaster’ limb of TPS as one of a small number 
of protection provisions at the level of national law. This provision allows the U.S. authorities 
to designate a foreign state (or part of it) for TPS relief if: 
(i) there has been an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental 
disaster in the state resulting in a substantial, but temporary, disruption of living 
conditions in the area affected, 
(ii) the foreign state is unable, temporarily, to handle adequately the return to the state 
of aliens who are nationals of the state, and 
(iii) the foreign state officially has requested designation under this subparagraph;141 
At the individual level, access to TPS is usually limited to nationals of the designated country 
who are already present in the United States.142 It thus serves principally to temporarily 
regularise the immigration status of persons present irregularly. In most cases, though, TPS 
status has turned out to be anything but ‘temporary’, with the affected countries repeatedly 
re-designated for TPS owing to the continuation of unstable conditions. 
Foreign countries are designated for TPS only relatively infrequently. However, over 
the years, the status has benefitted a substantial number of persons.143 Thus, over 331,000 
nationals of Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador benefitted from stay in the United States 
from TPS designations under this ‘environmental disaster’ limb following the 1998 Hurricane 
Mitch in Honduras and Nicaragua and the 2000 earthquake in El Salvador. Likewise, an 
additional 55,000 Haitian nationals received TPS in the United States after the 2010 
earthquake in Haiti. The Haiti designation, though, was done under a separate TPS limb that 
requires instead that the U.S. authorities determine the existence of ‘extraordinary and 
temporary conditions in the foreign state that prevent aliens who are nationals of the state 
from returning to the state in safety’, unless ‘permitting the aliens to remain temporarily in 
the United States is contrary to the national interest of the United States’.144 The 1997 
volcanic eruption in Montserrat was designated simultaneously under both this ‘extraordinary 
and temporary conditions’ limb and that relating to ‘environmental disaster’.  
The TPS provision reflects the recognition that wider humanitarian circumstances 
beyond the rules of international protection law may legitimately be considered for stay. 
 
141
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 See, for example, Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status (Jan. 21, 2010), Federal Register, Vol. 
75, No. 13, United States. In this regard, the re-designation of Haiti in 2011 to offer access to TPS for Haitians 
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Indeed, it is not granted on the basis of any international obligation. Moreover, its 
relationship to ‘international protection’ is somewhat tenuous. For instance, whilst the 
‘extraordinary and temporary conditions’ at least speaks to ‘protection’ concerns in terms of 
the ‘safety’ of returning nationals, the ‘environmental disasters’ limb turns on relations 
between the United States and the disaster-affected state and the latter’s capacity to 
‘adequately’ receive returns. Moreover, even for disasters that meet the formal criteria for 
one or other limbs, no legal expectation exists that TPS will be designated. Nor can 
individuals apply for protection absent a determination of TPS for their country by the U.S. 
authorities, which remains at the complete discretion of the U.S. authorities. Although legal 
scholars have criticised TPS on those grounds,145 the analysis here is not intended to 
downplay its utility but simply points out that it reflects a distinct legal approach not easily 
aligned with wider notions of international protection based on the severance of the 
protection relationship between individuals and their state of origin and an envisaged risk of 
serious harm if returned. 
Most scholarship views TPS as an isolated example of states legislating for mobility 
in the disaster context. However, a brief review of national refugee law instruments in the 
Americas suggests that it actually forms part of a wider tendency to legislate for discretionary 
powers to allow entry and stay on broader humanitarian grounds, particularly where 
protection claims are not recognised. These powers have been used to benefit persons 
affected by disasters. In the Caribbean, for instance, the power to grant leave to remain to 
rejected asylum-seekers on ‘humanitarian grounds’ was applied by Jamaica to Haitians after 
the 2010 earthquake.146 Similar powers exist in the refugee laws of the Cayman Islands and 
Montserrat in respect of rejected asylum-seekers who cannot be returned for ‘obvious and 
compelling reasons’.147 Suriname allows a residence permit to be granted to a rejected 
asylum-seeker if ‘he cannot in the light of the social and political situation in his country of 
origin and his personal circumstances reasonably be required to return to that country’.148 
Like TPS, these provisions treat the disaster as an event that, in its own right, may engage 
broader humanitarian considerations for the entry and stay of persons who do not qualify for 
international protection. Rooted in the positive exercise of state discretion in immigration 
matters, these provisions in turn reflect a wider approach to addressing such situations in the 
broader immigration law of this region. 
IV. IMMIGRATION LAW IN THE AMERICAS 
The legal literature on the environment-mobility nexus largely overlooks how wider 
immigration law could address international mobility challenges linked to adverse 
environmental conditions.149 This partly reflects a perception that the situation of persons 
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 The same is also true for disaster risk management law and policy frameworks. These mostly address cross-
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although some regional disaster risk management forums in the Americas have recently made general reference 
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fleeing environmental threats is analogous to that of refugees, thus requiring ‘international 
protection’ rather than immigration relief.150 Yet it also reflects a tendency to view the 
problem and its solution in terms of international law, thus discounting the relevance of 
immigration law as a field constituted principally at the national level.151 Indeed, most of the 
legal scholarship is quite dismissive of the role of national law in general.152 Even so, in the 
Pacific region, certain scholars have argued that international movement linked to climate 
change could be accommodated within existing migration mechanisms at the bilateral or 
regional level or by making tweaks to national immigration law in Australia or New 
Zealand.153 
In the Americas, the insight that immigration law might accommodate international 
mobility linked to environmental threats represents an important starting point for analysing 
state practice. Yet, in contrast with the relative paucity of documented legal practice in other 
regions of the world, the use of immigration law to address this mobility challenge by states 
in the Americas is not merely a matter of speculation for the future.154 Indeed, the creation by 
the United States of an ‘environmental disaster’ limb within TPS, which is essentially an 
immigration law provision for regularising status in disaster contexts rather than a tool of 
international protection,155 in 1990 is just one early example of pertinent practice in this 
region. In Central America, for example, various states adopted legal decrees in 1998 to 
regularise the immigration status of irregular migrants from other countries in the region that 
had been devastated by the effects of Hurricane Mitch.156 In Costa Rica alone, the resulting 
programme regularised around 150,000 disaster-affected migrants.157 It thus seems that the 
use of national immigration law in the Americas to resolve mobility challenges linked to the 
environment already represents fairly long-standing practice by some states in this region.  
This study of immigration law advances legal debate on the environment-mobility 
nexus on several points. Most importantly, it shows just how widespread is the use of 
immigration law instruments and concepts to resolve these challenges among states in the 
Americas. It starts by illustrating how ‘ordinary’ migration categories in national immigration 
law in this region have accommodated international mobility challenges linked to 
environmental factors. It then shows how a range of ‘exceptional’ migration categories have 
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also been created and deployed by states to accommodate persons whose legal situation 
cannot be resolved by application of ‘ordinary migration categories’. Overall, this analysis 
reinforces the impression of a shift in this region away from treating such challenges as 
matters of international protection to an approach based on immigration law.158 This means 
that, contrary to the assumptions of the existing legal scholarship, we cannot simply treat the 
regulation of mobility in this context as a blank canvas for international law. Rather, we must 
acknowledge that a distinctive legal approach to the problem already exists in the Americas 
and that it finds articulation among states not only in the global North but also in the global 
South.  
‘Ordinary’ Migration Categories 
A standard function of national immigration law is to codify and regulate access to what we 
might call ‘ordinary’ migration categories. These ordinary migration categories usually exist 
to facilitate migration that is based primarily on ‘pull’ factors in the country of destination or, 
in other words, an actual or prospective link on the part of the individual applicant with that 
country. Examples of short-term ordinary migration categories include such categories as 
visits or tourism, whilst longer-term ones include studies, employment or joining family in 
the country of destination. Thus, as a basis for travel, entry or stay by non-nationals, 
circumstances in the country of origin do not provide the principal rationale for these 
categories, which turns rather on certain forms of connection to the country of destination.159 
Even so, and despite the scant attention paid to these migration pathways in existing legal 
research on the environment-mobility nexus, this study shows that, in the Americas, they 
have accommodated mobility linked to environmental factors in a number of important ways. 
Firstly, it is clear that these ordinary migration categories are used in practice by 
persons leaving a disaster-affected country as a way to enter or stay in another country. For 
sudden-onset disasters, the empirical data points to a spike in long-term regular migration to 
the United States from Central America and the Caribbean in the year after a sudden-onset 
disaster hits one of those countries.160 For slow-onset disasters, the documented increase in 
migration to the United States from parts of Mexico affected by such phenomena provides a 
similar indication.161 In tandem, short-term ordinary migration categories have also provided 
a legal basis for entry by inhabitants of border regions fleeing the impact of an oncoming 
sudden hazardous event on their side of the border.162 In the Americas, the use of such 
ordinary migration categories has particular salience. Not only is this a region with significant 
intra-regional diaspora populations,163 but in this region international mobility linked to 
environmental threats tends to follow existing migration routes and pathways where 
possible.164 As a result, in the Americas, the prospect that people from a disaster-affected 
country might have family or other links to a destination country in this region is not remote, 
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 See Part III above.  
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 This is the case even for categories, such as those relating to seasonal labour migration, that aim also to 
provide a secondary benefit to countries of origin, such as development gains through remittances, skills 
acquisition and knowledge transfer, alongside the principal benefit of temporarily linking foreign workers to 
gaps in the labour market of the receiving country. 
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 See notes 115-118 and corresponding text. 
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 See notes 111-112 and corresponding text. 
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 See note 110 and corresponding text. 
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 Organization of American States, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN THE AMERICAS: FOURTH 
REPORT OF THE CONTINUOUS REPORTING SYSTEM ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN THE 
AMERICAS (2017).  
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 See examples cited in Part II. 
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especially among those sectors of society which possess the resources to migrate 
internationally.  
The fact that ordinary migration categories are able to accommodate a proportion of 
international movement linked to environmental push factors has far-reaching implications 
for debate about the legal ‘gap’ in relation to such mobility and its resolution. On the one 
hand, it suggests that less of a gap in the law exists in reality than may be assumed in the 
abstract. This also implies that ‘solutions’ must not focus exclusively on creating special new 
legal regimes for affected persons, but more generally must also seek to ensure that states 
fairly apply these ordinary migration categories, especially in relation to disaster-affected 
countries.165 The imposition of undue restrictions on such migration categories might well 
have a greater negative impact on prospects for the entry and stay of persons affected by 
environmental threats than the absence of a dedicated ‘protection’ regime. On the other hand, 
in principle, the fact of the disaster is legally irrelevant to the application of the ordinary 
migration categories, which turn instead on links to the destination country. Indeed, in the 
Americas, States clearly treat that criterion as the principal basis for determining the entry or 
stay of non-nationals, rather than any particular kind of ‘push’ factor that may exist in the 
country of origin. 
Secondly, for applicants affected by a disaster, some states in this region apply the 
formal criteria of these ordinary migration categories in a flexible manner. For instance, in 
Canada, immigration law allows the authorities to expedite applications under the ordinary 
migration categories, or waive one or more formal criteria, if justified by ‘humanitarian and 
compassionate considerations’.166 This is applied in response to disaster situations, and, for 
some serious disasters, ‘special measures’ policies are adopted by the government that 
instruct officials to exercise these powers in order to expedite applications or waive formal 
criteria where requested by applicants ‘seriously and directly affected’ by the disaster.167 
Meanwhile, the United States standing policy of ‘temporary relief measures’ encourages 
immigration officials to exercise their innate discretion to expedite applications or waive the 
formal criteria for certain ordinary migration categories at the request of an individual 
applicant.168 Based on the periodic announcements reminding migrants of this policy, these 
relief measures seem to be applied mainly to those affected by ‘natural disasters’, not only 
overseas but also in the United States itself.169 
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 The use of visa regimes, which are often imposed on poorer countries that are more vulnerable to the impact 
of hazards, is a particular cause for concern. In the Americas, the countries whose nationals are most frequently 
required to secure a visa for lawful travel to another country within this region are Cuba, the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti, although many other poor countries in this region that are regularly affected by disasters do 
not experience such extensive visa requirements for travel in the Americas. See Cantor, 2018, supra note 10, at 
36, 47 and 59.  
166
 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), sec. 25 (2001), Canada. 
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 These ‘special measures’ policies have been adopted, inter alia, for the 1998 Turkey earthquake, the 2004 
Asian tsunami, the 2010 Haiti earthquake and the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (Cantor, 2015, supra 
note 10, at 33-34). 
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 See USCIS, Immigration Help Available to Those Affected by Natural Disasters, at 
https://www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/immigration-help-available-those-affected-natural-disasters. For comment, 
see Cantor, 2015, supra note 10, at 34-35.  
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 Situational ‘temporary relief measures’ have been announced, inter alia, for such disasters overseas as: 
tropical storms in the Caribbean in 2008; the 2010 Icelandic volcano eruption; the 2010 Chile earthquakes; 
Tropical Storm Agatha in Guatemala in 2010; the 2011 earthquakes and tsunami in Japan; extreme flooding in 
Central America in 2011; Hurricane Sandy in the Caribbean in 2012; Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines in 
2013; Hurricane Harvey in the United States in 2017; California Wildfires in 2007 and 2018; Hurricane 
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This flexible approach to the criteria for entry or stay under the ordinary migration 
categories is particularly codified in the law and policy of these global North states. However, 
as a legal practice in the Americas, the approach is also evident among states in the global 
South. In Central America, for example, Costa Rica has applied a broader understanding of 
the ‘family’ category than normally permitted by law so that Nicaraguans present irregularly 
but personally affected by a sudden-onset disaster in Nicaragua could stay lawfully as family 
members, with all the benefits of that regular status.170 Likewise, in South America, 
Colombia regularised some Haitians arriving after the 2010 earthquake by flexibly applying 
work and student categories.171 In the Caribbean, Dominica and Antigua and Barbuda relaxed 
certain eligibility requirements of the ordinary migration categories for Haitians in 2010.172 In 
the 2017 hurricane season, territories such as Montserrat and the British Virgin Islands, also 
lifted immigration restrictions or waived visa requirements to facilitate entry by affected 
persons.173 Overall, assimilating disaster-affected persons to ordinary migration categories 
has the advantage of access to ensuing regular status and rights. The states’ flexibility in this 
respect contrasts sharply with their rigid application of refugee law, supporting a view that 
they see mobility in this context principally as a matter of immigration law rather than 
international protection. 
Thirdly, these migration pathways are also beginning to be shaped by free movement 
accords. At present, ‘citizens’ of certain sub-regional integration mechanisms in Central 
America, South America and the Caribbean benefit from specific forms of treaty-based free 
movement across borders within the respective bloc.174 Some scholars have already argued in 
favour of extending free movement arrangements as a means of facilitating migration in the 
context of environmental threats.175 Yet States in the Americas have already begun to use 
such free movement provisions specifically to facilitate entry and stay by nationals of a 
disaster-affected country in their sub-regional bloc. For instance, after Hurricane Maria 
devastated Dominica in 2017, the authorities in Trinidad and Tobago used the CARICOM 
short-term visa-free stay provision to shelter affected Dominicans.176 In tandem, Antigua, 
Grenada, St Lucia and St Vincent also welcomed Dominicans under the OECS provision for 
entry and short-term stay, expediting those cases and waiving documentary requirements 
where documents had been lost in the disaster.177 Lacking disaster-specific provisions, these 
accords now seem to offer additional useful ordinary migration categories for states to apply 
in disasters. 
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Florence in the United States in 2018; and the 2018 Typhoon Mangkhut in the Philippines. Announcements may 
be accessed at http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/special-situations/previous-special-situations. 
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 Cantor, 2015, supra note 10, at 32. 
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 Ibid, at 33.  
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 Ibid, at 35. 
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 Caribbean Migration Consultations (CMC), Consultation towards a Framework for Regional Cooperation on 
Human Mobility in the context of Disasters and the Adverse Effects of Climate Change in the Caribbean (2019) 
at https://caribbeanmigration.org/sites/default/files/report-climate_change_and_human_mobility_f_0.pdf, 15.  
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 Relevant mechanisms include, respectively, the System for Central-American Integration (SICA), the 
Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) and, for the Caribbean, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). See Cantor, 2018, supra note 10, at 36-37, 47-48 and 
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 Ama Francis, Free Movement Agreements & Climate-induced Migration: A Caribbean Case Study (2019) at 
columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2019/09/FMAs-Climate-Induced-Migration-AFrancis.pdf ; Wood, supra note 84; 
Black et al, supra note 58, at 449 . 
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 Francis, supra note 175, at 18. 
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 Ibid; -, Antigua Prepares for Influx of Dominicans, BARBADOS TODAY, Sept. 24, 2017, at 
https://barbadostoday.bb/2017/09/24/antigua-prepares-for-influx-of-dominicans/. 
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‘Exceptional’ Migration Categories 
National law also often provides for what we might call ‘exceptional’ migration categories. 
These categories usually take the form of general legal provisions, or powers conferred on 
immigration officials, created to regulate special or exceptional situations that fall outside the 
ordinary migration categories. They are squarely concerned with areas of immigration law 
where states enjoy a wide sovereign discretion, as where an applicant lacks a substantive 
connection to the destination state or a claim under binding rules of international protection 
but other countervailing factors still exist. In the Americas, pertinent legal practice makes it 
clear that many states view disasters as precisely one such factor where special consideration 
may be required, in relation to the application not only of ordinary migration categories but 
also these exceptional migration categories. Given the diversity of legal systems and juridical 
perspectives across this region, it is appropriate to analyse exceptional migration categories, 
and their application to disaster situations, along a spectrum of ‘codification’ that reflects the 
different degrees to which they are expressly codified by national immigration law.  
At one end of this spectrum, the discretionary power to resolve exceptional 
immigration cases takes the form of an inherent faculty not specifically codified by 
immigration legislation, as is apparently the case in Venezuela.178 A little further along are 
states where the existence of this power is confirmed by immigration law but its scope is left 
open to the discretion of the national authorities, as in Colombia and Paraguay.179 Similarly, 
in the Caribbean, the law in British overseas territories and former colonies often gives 
officials the discretion to postpone, or overlook, deciding whether a non-national falls into 
one of the categories of ‘prohibited’ immigrants who must be denied entry and instead grant 
leave to stay.180 Crucially, across the Americas, states have exercised this kind of broad 
discretionary powers to grant entry or stay to disaster-affected persons on a case-by-case 
basis. In 2010, the Dominican Republic used apparently innate discretionary powers to grant 
entry to certain categories of Haitians affected by the earthquake on a humanitarian basis.181 
After Hurricane Irma in 2017, the U.S. unincorporated territory of Puerto Rico used inherent 
discretion to grant entry to thousands of persons evacuated from the British Virgin Islands, 
Dutch Sint Maarten and French Saint Martin.182 In Chilean law, a discretionary power to 
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 For example, Colombian law provides for a power to authorise entry and stay on extraordinary grounds 
where this is necessary (Decreto 1067, Art. 2.2.1.11.2.5 (May 26, 2015), as modified by Decreto No. 1325, Aug. 
12, 2016, at https://www.cancilleria.gov.co/sites/default/files/Normograma/docs/decreto_1067_2015.htm, 
Colombia). In Paraguay, the law gives the Director General a general discretionary power to ‘carry out other 
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of Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands and Montserrat (see Cantor, 2018, supra note 10, 60). On 
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Protection Act, sec. 24(1). 
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 Cantor, 2015, supra note 10, at 61. 
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grant stay in cases outside the ordinary migration categories was applied to benefit a small 
number of Haitians after the earthquake.183 
However, these broad discretionary powers are also used to facilitate stay on a group 
basis. In some cases, this involves creating special regularisation programmes to which 
nationals of the disaster-affected country who are already present irregularly in the 
destination country can apply. In 1998, Central American states created such regularisation 
programmes for migrants from countries affected by Hurricane Mitch.184 In 2010, similar 
one-off regularisation programmes were created for Haitians present in Ecuador and 
Venezuela, using broad immigration discretion based on, respectively, statutory and innate 
powers.185 Such powers have also been invoked to create legal measures that fall short of 
formal stay but which temporarily suspend removals to a disaster-affected country on a group 
basis. For instance, many states in the Americas drew on broad innate discretionary powers to 
temporarily suspend the removal of Haitians after the 2010 earthquake.186 Overall, the 
breadth of such powers gives states considerable latitude in fixing the criteria for their 
application, as well as excluding individuals in relation to whom security- or crime-related 
concerns exist.187 In practice, though, these broad powers of immigration discretion are 
exercised by states in the Americas to the benefit of nationals of a country devastated by a 
serious sudden-onset disaster.  
Toward the other end of the ‘codification’ spectrum are those national laws that 
codify when this immigration discretion should be exercised positively. In the Americas, this 
usually turns on the existence of ‘humanitarian’ considerations in the individual case. 
Although the specific wording varies between countries,188 the law of at least fifteen states in 
this region include an exceptional migration category based on some variation of the concept 
of ‘humanitarian considerations’.189 In some countries, this concept is not further defined 
further by national immigration law, leaving the potential for inclusion of disaster victims 
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 Decreto No. 248 (Feb. 9, 2010), Ecuador. See, further, Cantor, Law, Policy and Practice, 37-39. 
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 They include the United States, Mexico, Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, as well as the British 
Turks and Caicos Islands and the French Antilles territories of Martinique and Guadeloupe. See UNHRC, 
Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, Michel Forst, Addendum: Forced 
Returns of Haitians from Third States, UN Doc A/HRC/20/35/Add.1, 6-7 (2012); Cantor, 2018, supra note 10, 
at 38, 61 and 63. 
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out for Haitians in Canada, see Cantor, 2015, supra note 10, at 40-41. 
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 Examples from Central America include ‘exceptional humanitarian reasons’ (Panama – entry and stay); 
‘humanitarian cause’ (Mexico – entry and stay); ‘humanitarian motives’ (Honduras – entry); ‘humanitarian 
reason’ (Costa Rica - entry); ‘humanitarian reasons’ (Guatemala – entry and stay; Honduras – stay; Mexico – 
travel and stay; Nicaragua – stay);’humanitarian visa’ (Mexico – travel; Nicaragua – entry and stay);’reasons of 
humanity’ (Costa Rica – stay). See Cantor, 2015, supra note 10, at 38, footnote 207. The same is true also for 
South America (ibid, 49, FN 306) and the Caribbean (ibid, 60, 63).  
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 By sub-region, those countries include: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama 
(Central America); Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay (South America); Trinidad and Tobago, 
the Dutch Antilles islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustasius and Saba (Caribbean); and Mexico (North America). For 
references to most relevant laws (except El Salvador and Canada), see Cantor, 2018, supra note 10, Annex D. In 
Canada, the authorities have the power to grant permanent resident status if ‘justified by humanitarian and 
compassionate considerations relating to the foreign national’ (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, sec. 
25(1)). In the new Salvadorian migration law, temporary resident status can be granted to persons who ‘for 
humanitarian reasons… justify a special treatment’ (Ley Especial de Migración y de Extranjería, Art. 109 (20) 
(Apr. 2, 2019), at www.migracion.gob.sv/servicios/descargables/informes-institucionales/, El Salvador). 
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open to official discretion in individual cases. This is true of the special residence permit that 
may be granted for ‘humanitarian reasons’ in Honduras and the extension of stay category for 
‘humanitarian reasons’ in Nicaragua.190 Likewise, the law in Uruguay allows entry as a 
temporary resident to be granted for ‘exceptional reasons… of a humanitarian character’ but 
does not define what that means.191 In the Caribbean, the law in Trinidad and Tobago allows 
leave to remain to be granted if ‘humanitarian considerations’ that warrant the granting of 
special relief from deportation exist,192 similar to the law in the Dutch Antilles.193 In addition, 
this immigration law concept is articulated in several national refugee laws.194 None of these 
laws further define the ‘humanitarian considerations’ concept but, in practice, such broad 
provisions have sometimes been applied by officials to persons affected by a disaster in their 
country of origin.195  
More commonly, though, and particularly in Latin American countries, national 
immigration law more closely defines the scope of ‘humanitarian considerations’ concept. 
This is usually done by reference to three general sets of circumstances, although it is 
important to point out that not all three are always codified in the law of any particular state. 
The circumstances are that the applicant is: (1) the ‘victim’ of serious adversity, such as grave 
crimes or human rights violations; or (2) ‘vulnerable’ in the destination country, due to 
factors such as age, gender, disability or ill health; or (3) ‘facing serious danger’ to life or 
integrity in the country of origin.196 Although this last scenario may resemble a rule of 
international protection, its application is usually discretionary.197 Disaster-affected persons 
are sometimes accommodated within such broad renderings of the ‘humanitarian 
considerations’ concept. For instance, in 2017, Haitians present irregularly in Argentina were 
granted stay under a general provision of this kind, which was interpreted as applying to 
‘natural disasters and their effects’.198 Likewise, the ‘humanitarian and compassionate’ 
considerations provision of Canadian law is interpreted as a test of ‘unusual and undeserved 
or disproportionate hardship’, to be determined by reference to factors that include conditions 
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en uitzetting Bonaire, Sint Eustatius en Saba Rijksdienst Caribisch Nederland Immigratie- en 
Naturalisatiedienst Oktober 2010 Afkortingenlijst CTU-BES, sec. 2.3.6 (Oct. 2010), at 
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in the country of origin, particularly those that have ‘a direct negative impact on the applicant 
such as … natural disasters’.199 
However, for our purposes, the opposite end of this ‘codification’ spectrum actually 
consists of the growing number of immigration law provisions in the region that specify 
disasters as a ‘humanitarian consideration’ or otherwise as the basis for an exceptional 
migration category. Ten states across the Americas take this approach,200 with the tendency 
particularly accentuated in South America and North America but also becoming increasingly 
common in Central America.201 The ubiquity of these provisions supports the analysis that 
states in the Americas view international mobility linked to environmental factors not through 
the lens of international protection, but principally through the lens of immigration law as an 
integral expression of their asserted sovereign right to determine who is allowed entry and 
stay in the territory of the state, treating the humanitarian impact of disasters as a legal basis 
for exercising state discretion in favour of affected persons. Starting with South America, 
national immigration law in Argentina stipulates that transitory residence for ‘humanitarian 
reasons’ can be granted to those who ‘temporarily cannot return to their countries of origin… 
due to consequences generated by natural or man-made environmental disasters’.202 Brazil 
authorises ‘humanitarian reception’ for a person from ‘any country in a situation of… major 
calamity [or] environmental disaster’.203 Ecuador gives stay for ‘humanitarian reasons’, 
including being ‘a victim of natural or environmental disasters’.204 Peru authorises 
‘humanitarian residence’ where migration is due to ‘natural and environmental disasters’.205 
Meanwhile, Bolivian law makes provision for the admission of persons at risk due to climate 
effects or disasters.206 
Similarly, in North America, for the purpose of granting of a humanitarian visa to a 
non-national outside the country, Mexico defines ‘humanitarian reasons’ as meaning that the 
person seeking to travel to Mexico ‘finds herself in a situation of danger to her life or 
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servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/165000-169999/167004/norma.htm, Argentina. 
203
 Lei No. 13445, Art. 30 (May 24, 2017), at www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-
2018/2017/lei/l13445.htm, Brazil; Decreto No. 9199, Art. 145 (Nov. 20, 2017), at 
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environmental, nuclear [or] chemical disasters or hunger’ (ibid, Art. 4(16)).  
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integrity owing to… a duly accredited natural disaster’207 or that she is ‘victim of a natural 
catastrophe’.208 Albeit not expressly based on the concept of ‘humanitarian considerations’, 
immigration law in the United States, as already mentioned, does give authorities the 
discretion to designate TPS for, inter alia, an ‘environmental disaster’.209 In Canada, national 
law likewise allows temporary suspension of removals, inter alia, due to an ‘environmental 
disaster resulting in a substantial temporary disruption of living conditions’ in the country of 
origin.210 More recently, in Central America, some of the states that have adopted new 
immigration laws also refer to disasters in exceptional migration categories based on 
humanitarian considerations. Thus, in Guatemala, the existence of a ‘natural catastrophe in 
neighbouring countries, which obliges the persons or group of persons to flee for their lives’ 
is listed among the ‘humanitarian reasons’ for legal entry and stay.211 In El Salvador, factors 
to be taken into account by immigration officials in deciding temporary resident applications 
based on ‘humanitarian reasons’ specifically include, inter alia, the existence of an 
‘internationally-recognised crisis’ or that any non-national who does not meet the criteria for 
an ordinary migration category is in ‘a situation of vulnerability or danger to life owing to … 
natural disasters, environmental [disasters]…’.212  
Overall, then, legal practice in the Americas shows that surprisingly few states have 
not applied such exceptional migration categories as a matter of national immigration law to 
accommodate disaster-affected persons whose legal situation cannot be resolved via ordinary 
migration categories. Indeed, there is no real absence of legal tools to resolve the challenge of 
entry and stay in light of prevailing humanitarian considerations in this mobility context, and 
they are applied in practice. Yet, whilst some ordinary migration categories may provide 
permanent stay, exceptional migration categories mostly give temporary stay. The initial 
period varies between one year (e.g. Costa Rica) and six years (e.g. Panama), although this is 
normally renewable and can offer a pathway to longer forms of stay under ordinary migration 
categories. Such stay also usually affords standard the entitlements to work and access 
services specified by immigration law in that country. Indeed, in many countries, these 
immigration categories provide a defined regular status, a period of stay and a range of rights 
no less favourable than those conferred by refugee status.213  
Finally, the legal practice in the Americas raises a question about the kinds of 
environmental threats that such measures accommodate. Here, the empirical evidence shows 
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that people who move in the context of sudden- or slow-onset disasters have both been 
accommodated under ordinary migration categories. However, where the disaster is expressly 
contemplated as a basis for entry or stay, whether in the flexible application of ordinary 
migration categories or via exceptional migration categories, the legal practice in the 
Americas suggests that such provisions are mostly applied by national immigration 
authorities to resolve the situation of persons affected by major sudden-onset disasters. On its 
face, this seems to confirm the preoccupation of scholars that persons who migrate as a result 
of the impact of slow-onset disasters will be denied access to such special measures because 
the link to mobility is easier to establish in the context of sudden-onset disasters.214 The 
implicit requirement of most states as a matter of law or practice that a person must be 
directly and seriously affected by the disaster in order to benefit from the application of such 
special measures might seem to further reinforce this risk, since that link seems more 
straightforward to evidence in situations of sudden-onset disasters as compared to slow-onset 
processes. 
At the same time, many of the national law provisions underpinning these special 
measures (under both ordinary and exceptional migration categories) do not refer expressly to 
a ‘disaster’ but rather to broader ‘humanitarian considerations’.215 In principle, then, they do 
not rule out the application of these special measures to persons affected, on the one hand, by 
slow-onset disasters, or, on the other, by sudden- or slow-onset hazards or hazardous events 
that have not resulted in a disaster at the societal level. Moreover, not one of the provisions 
that do refer to disaster situations as a basis for special measures gives any reason to think 
that slow-onset disasters fall outside their scope.216 It is also the case that several of these 
provisions refer to ‘calamities’ or ‘catastrophes’ alongside, or instead of, ‘disasters’,217 
suggesting concepts which could equally include hazardous events more generally. Further, 
as to the origins of the events, these provisions often refer to ‘natural’ disasters or 
catastrophes,218 although many refer also,219 or instead,220 to ‘environmental’ disasters or 
catastrophes. The latter concept appears to include events that are ‘man-made’ in origin.221 In 
short, although the current practice may be to apply special measures mainly to persons who 
are seriously and directly affected by major sudden-onset disasters linked to natural hazards, 
relevant national law provisions suggest that a broader set of scenarios may be contemplated 
ultimately. 
V. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND FRAMEWORKS IN THE AMERICAS 
In the Americas, state practice in relation to the challenge posed by international mobility 
linked to environmental adversity also takes the form of joint action at the international 
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level.222 This practice plays out principally in forums concerned with migration rather than 
international protection and at the level of sub-regional initiatives rather than regional or 
global forums. Crucially, the main focus of such joint action is on promoting appropriate 
legal responses to the challenge by participating states at the level of national law rather than 
creating new treaty law. However, the scope of cooperative ambition has increased over time. 
Thus, whilst early forms of collective action represented ad hoc responses to the devastation 
wrought by certain very serious disasters, since the mid-2010s, several sub-regional forums 
have been engaged in developing normative frameworks that promote more predictable 
responses at the level of national law. As yet, states appear to be content with this form of 
international action and no serious efforts have been made to ‘harden’ the legal character of 
these frameworks through creating treaties. Even so, the existence and scope of these 
frameworks raises important questions about the future development of international law in 
this field. 
Early Ad Hoc Actions 
State practice at the sub-regional level is relatively well-established in the Americas. 
Certainly, state cooperation on the international mobility challenges posed by sudden-onset 
disasters is not new in this region. However, the early instances of state practice at the sub-
regional level tend to involve the collective recognition of the international mobility 
consequences of certain extremely serious sudden-onset disasters and the promotion of 
suitable responses at the level of national law. This is evident in the way that states in such 
sub-regional forums responded to the devastation wrought by Hurricane Mitch. In 1998, for 
instance, the Meeting of Central American Presidents appealed for: 
…the understanding of the International Community [sic] in order that a general 
amnesty be conceded to undocumented Central American immigrants who currently 
reside in different countries, with the objective of avoiding their deportation and, 
consequentially, greater aggravation of the current situation of our countries.223 
At the national level, this declaration by the four most-affected states facilitated the 
designation of TPS for Hondurans and Nicaraguans by the United States as well as the 
adoption of special measures for affected persons in national immigration law by various 
Central American states.224  
The mobility impact of Hurricane Mitch was also addressed by other sub-regional 
forums, albeit also in an ad hoc or responsive manner. Thus, in early 1999, the matter was 
raised by states participating in the Regional Conference on Migration (RCM), a specialised 
regular sub-regional forum for facilitating joint discussion and action on shared migration 
challenges among a wider constituency of eleven member states, mostly from North and 
Central America. In the resulting Communication, the RCM member states specially 
endorsed ‘the adoption of migratory measures for the benefit of nationals of the countries 
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 Meeting of Central American Presidents, Reunión Extraordinaria de Presidentes Centroamericanos: 
Declaración Conjunta, Comalapa, El Salvador (Nov.9, 1998), at 3. 
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 For Central American examples, see notes 156-157 and corresponding text. A copy of the declaration that 
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of TPS. See Letter from Central American Presidents to William Clinton, President of the United States of 
America (Nov. 9, 1998), at http://goo.gl/gG1rtP.  
DRAFT: Accepted for publication by Chicago Journal of International Law for Vol. 21(2) 
37

affected by hurricane Mitch on the part of Costa Rica and the United States of America’.225 
Both sub-regional forums, then, called not only for a common response on the part of states 
to the international challenges posed by this particularly serious disaster but also for the use 
of national immigration law by relevant states to resolve those challenges. 
 Yet Hurricane Mitch is not the only disaster where such responsive collective action 
manifested itself. Indeed, sub-regional forums across the Americas also promoted this kind of 
special immigration law measures as a form of collective response to the overwhelming 
impact of the 2010 Haiti earthquake. For instance, in 2010, the twelve states which at that 
time comprised the sub-regional Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) adopted a 
collective decision to promote ‘joint actions’. That UNASUR decision specifically exhorted 
‘those Member States that still have not applied special processes of migratory regularisation 
for the benefit of Haitian citizens to do so’.226 Likewise, the sub-regional Bolivarian Alliance 
for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA), comprised at that time of nine mostly left-leaning 
governments, called on member states to ‘decree a migratory amnesty that regularises the 
migratory status of Haitian citizens resident in ALBA countries’.227 As a result, several states 
that were involved in one or both forums went on to adopt special migratory measures into 
national law for the benefit of Haitians present irregularly on their territories.228 
These examples demonstrate that, from the 1990s to the early 2010s, many states in 
the Americas did in fact participate in sub-regional forums that took joint action on 
international mobility linked to environmental adversity. The responsive and ad hoc nature of 
such action is immediately apparent. It manifested only following the occurrence of 
extremely serious sudden-onset disasters that posed humanitarian challenges suddenly across 
the pertinent sub-region on a significant scale. On the mobility aspect of these challenges, 
they were clearly seen through the prism of immigration law rather than international 
protection. In particular, these sub-regional forums sought to promote, on a humanitarian 
basis, the immigration regularisation of nationals of the affected state who were present 
irregularly elsewhere. As such, the joint action taken by states during this period was thus 
oriented toward encouraging a common response at the national law level, in the form of 
special migratory measures, rather than creating new international frameworks for the future.  
Promoting Frameworks for Cooperation 
Since the mid-2010s, states in several sub-regional forums in the Americas have been 
working to develop normative frameworks for promoting a more predictable response at the 
national level to future disaster displacement and cooperation between states at the sub-
regional level. In this process, the influence of external actors has been central to encouraging 
states to build in this way on past practice at national and sub-regional levels. That work was 
led initially by the Nansen Initiative (2012-15) – a global intergovernmental process focused 
on disaster displacement – and is being continued by its successor initiative, the Platform on 
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Disaster Displacement (PDD) (2016-).229 Even so, states in each sub-region have clearly 
drawn on the expertise and other resources offered by this external actor to shape normative 
tools that they view as useful in responding to the challenges posed by potentially increasing 
levels of international mobility linked to disasters.  
The development of the pertinent sub-regional frameworks in the Americas has taken 
place mainly in interstate forums concerned with cooperation on migration issues rather than 
international protection. Nonetheless, in 2014, engagement by the Nansen Initiative at the 
regional level resulted in Latin American and Caribbean states recognising the ‘challenges 
posed by climate change and natural disasters, as well as by the displacement of persons 
across borders that these phenomena may cause in the region’ in the Brazil Declaration on 
Refugees.230 The accompanying Brazil Plan of Action of 2014 called on the office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to prepare a study on this theme 
in order to facilitate ‘regional cooperation’.231 That study, commissioned by UNHCR and the 
PDD (as successor to the Nansen Initiative) and published in 2018, fed into the South 
American and Caribbean sub-regional processes described below. However, it seems that no 
further measures were taken at the regional level. 
In tandem, the Nansen Initiative had been working with states at the sub-regional 
level. In 2013, a Central America consultation recommended that a set of guidelines drawing 
on national practice be developed through the sub-regional RCM forum.232 On the proposal 
of Costa Rica, this was approved by the RCM.233 In 2016, based on a study commissioned by 
the Nansen Initiative,234 the RCM adopted non-binding guidance on ‘Protection for Persons 
moving across Borders in the Context of Disasters’.235 A similar process in South America, 
initiated in 2015, led to a proposal by Chile to develop guidelines through the South 
American Conference on Migration (SCM), a sub-regional forum of 12 South American 
states.236 In 2018, with support from the PDD, the SCM in turn adopted its own non-binding 
‘Regional Guidelines on Protection and Assistance for Persons Displaced across Borders and 
Migrants in Countries affected by Disasters of Natural Origin’.237  
From 2019, the PDD (as successor to the Nansen Initiative) has sought to build on this 
engagement elsewhere in the Americas by supporting a similar process of consultation in the 
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Caribbean through the sub-regional migration forum of the Caribbean Migration 
Consultations (CMC).238 In 2019, at the first Caribbean consultation, the 2018 UNHCR study 
requested by Latin American and Caribbean states in the 2014 Brazil Plan of Action was 
presented to participants. The participating states framed the new challenges at regional and 
national levels as a priority ‘in a context of increased migration and displacement linked with 
climate change and disasters’.239 As a next step, those same states agreed on the need to 
‘systematize approaches, harmonize them, and come up with consolidated policies through 
collaboration’.240 In the coming years, the creation of a similar sub-regional framework in the 
Caribbean thus looks like a possibility.  
Sub-regional Frameworks: Approach and Scope 
The guidelines adopted by the RCM and the SCM represent a significant addition to state 
practice. They reflect the views and approval of the large number of participating states in the 
sub-regions of North and Central America (through the RCM) and South America (through 
the SCM). Equally, as a result, their guidance extends to that same range of member states 
across the Americas. Moreover, as the first international instruments expressly oriented 
toward regulation of international mobility in the context of disasters, they provide a crucial 
indication of how states in this region legally frame these aspects of the environment-
mobility nexus. The approach taken in the RCM Guide and the SCM Guidelines thus offers 
useful insight into how, in the future, international law may come to relate to the challenges 
posed by international mobility in the context of environmental adversity.  
There is considerable consistency in the approach adopted by both the RCM Guide 
and the SCM Guidelines. Those points of convergence give an important indication of how 
states frame the key issues. At the outset, though, certain drafting differences between the 
two instruments must be acknowledged. Most crucially, they differ in how the guidance is 
presented. Thus, the RCM Guide describes its normative framework as ‘effective practices’ 
and gives significant detail on each, whilst the SCM sets out broader ‘general guidelines’ on 
purported ‘minimum standards’.241 Yet, in reality, this difference is merely one of more or 
less detail on the norms affirmed. The scope of intervention that each instrument envisages 
differs somewhat too. The RCM Guide mainly addresses immigration and consular 
authorities on measure for the benefit of affected persons post-disaster. That scenario is 
covered by the SCM Guidelines but they also promote a ‘whole of government’ approach to 
avoid the risk of displacement from the outset.242 In this sense, the SCM Guidelines have 
broader scope. 
Nonetheless, on the key question of how host states should regulate international 
mobility in the context of disasters, the instruments are highly consistent in their approach. 
Firstly, they evidence a view by states that new international law norms are not required. 
They do not ‘create a new set of state obligations, extend existing state obligations, or require 
that new laws be passed’.243 Rather, the instruments are intended only to ‘support the more 
effective and consistent use of existing law, policy and practice’ by states.244 The body of 
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existing national law in member states is thus seen as sufficient to respond to the challenges 
of this scenario. In tandem, such national law is also affirmed as the main basis for the 
resulting normative frameworks, which merely provide guidance on how to apply it.245 This 
approach of building from existing national law and practice is distinct from other soft law 
instruments that either express aspirational norms that lack a firm basis in existing law or 
interpret ‘hard’ rules of international law in their application to a particular group or theme. 
Secondly, both the RCM Guide and the SCM Guidelines treat this area as principally 
a matter of immigration law. The frameworks are primarily built upon the national practice of 
states in each sub-region of favourably exercising their discretion in immigration matters 
where ‘humanitarian grounds’ such as a disaster exist.246 As such, each instrument also 
acknowledges that states retain the inherent discretion to adopt more generous approaches 
than those described in the sub-regional norms.247 International obligations are acknowledged 
but are incorporated mainly as a set of parameters that may limit the extent to which states 
can decline to favourably exercise discretion in some situations, rather than the core legal 
basis for resulting measures.248 Moreover, both instruments address the legal challenges not 
only for people arriving due to a disaster in their own country, but also for people already 
outside their own country who are affected by a disaster there or by a disaster in the country 
in which they are living or through which they are transiting.249 
Thirdly, the norms in both instruments are rooted principally in the use of ‘regular’ 
and ‘exceptional’ migration categories.250 Both guides distinguish the (humanitarian) 
‘protection’ afforded by these categories from ‘international protection’,251 which each 
highlights as relevant to disaster displacement only in rare cases. Moreover, each instrument 
promotes active forms of ‘cooperation’ between the host state and state of origin,252 
including: bilateral measures to further cooperation and mutual assistance, especially where 
they share a border;253 and, in ‘solidarity’ with a country of origin that lacks capacity to 
receive returns, granting entry or stay to persons only tangentially affected by a disaster (see 
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below).254 The SCM framework is expressly based on coordination between these two 
states,255 and it even posits a principle of ‘shared responsibility’ between them, especially if 
both are SCM members.256 Thus, in each sub-regional forum, it seems that states do not 
generally view the situation of disaster-affected persons through an ‘international protection’ 
lens. 
Finally, neither the RCM Guide nor the SCM Guidelines attempt to create a new legal 
status. Rather, they simply distil from the legal practice of states in each sub-region a 
consensus approach to when the discretion to allow entry or stay on humanitarian grounds 
should usually be positively exercised in disaster contexts. This is when the person is 
‘directly and seriously affected by the disaster’.257 Some interpretation of this concept is 
provided by the RCM Guide.258 The emphasis is squarely on the proximity and severity of the 
disaster’s impact on the individual, in light of any pre-existing vulnerabilities (i.e. rather than 
a rupture in their political link with the state of origin or the risk of human rights standards 
being violated as for international protection). The interpretation in the RCM Guide of a 
disaster’s ‘direct’ impact as a ‘sudden and severe change’ suggests slow-onset disasters are 
not included.259 This is confirmed by the guide’s affirmation that it applies only to disasters 
‘caused in part on in whole by a sudden and serious natural hazard’.260By contrast, the SCM 
Guidelines expressly include other slow-onset disasters and events ‘that may be associated 
with adverse effects of climate change’ when they contribute in fundamental ways to the 
affected person’s decision to cross an international border.261 Otherwise, though, the terms of 
each instrument strongly suggest that the principal concern is with ‘disasters’, a concept 
defined by reference to the extant UN policy.262 As such, it seems that hazards or hazardous 
events that do not reach the implicit threshold for societal impact will fall generally outside 
the scope of the guidance and be left purely to the discretion of national state authorities. 
Despite their recent adoption, these two sub-regional instruments have already begun 
to shape state practice in the Americas. Thus, in the RCM Guide, the principles on bilateral 
cooperation have been acted upon by some states. For instance, Costa Rica and Panama have 
broken new ground in the sub-region of Central America by developing from earlier drafts of 
the RCM Guide shared by PDD a set of bilateral mechanisms and policies to manage 
displacement and disaster risks.263 These include a set of draft Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs) for their respective disaster response systems to address cross-border displacement in 
disaster contexts.264 The structure, principles and rules in the SOPs are based directly on the 
RCM Guide. Simulation exercises to put the SOPs into practice have been carried out jointly 
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by the two countries, again with the involvement of PDD.265 Similarly, the RCM Guide 
facilitated coordination between Costa Rica and Nicaragua to allow 150 Nicaraguans to cross 
the border and shelter in Costa Rica from the effects of Hurricane Otto in 2016.266  
The two sub-regional instruments, and the processes that led to their adoption, also 
seem to have encouraged states in Central and South America to incorporate national law 
provisions to specifically regulate the entry and stay of persons affected by a disaster when 
revising their immigration laws. Since the Nansen Initiative started work on its consultations 
in those regions in 2013, at least five states in these sub-regions have adopted significant new 
provisions of national law specific to the situation of disaster-affected non-nationals when 
overhauling their immigration legislation. They are Guatemala (2016), Brazil (2017), 
Ecuador (2017), Peru (2017) and El Salvador (2019).267 Paraguay is also reported to be 
considering such provisions as it debates adoption of a new immigration law.268 
Finally, the legal practice of states in the Americas has also had an impact on policy 
development at the global level. In 2015, the Nansen Initiative presented an Agenda for the 
Protection of Cross-border Displaced Persons in the context of Disasters and Climate Change 
(Protection Agenda) which, based on seven regional consultations with states and other 
actors, sets out norms for responding to cross-border disaster displacement.269 At that 
conference, over one hundred states from different regions endorsed these global 
guidelines.270 However, on closer study, it is evident that the approach and many of the more 
novel norms described by the Protection Agenda for ‘protecting cross-border disaster-
displaced persons’ are derived principally from state practice in the Americas.271 Even so, in 
2018, the approach in the Protection Agenda was endorsed by the Global Compact for Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration as a basis for developing ‘coherent approaches to address the 
challenges of migration movements in the context of sudden-onset and slow-onset natural 
disasters’.272  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This case study of the Americas contributes to debates on how international law should 
address international mobility in the context of environmental threats. As a whole, it 
illustrates how greater engagement with different kinds of evidence on, respectively, the 
empirical dynamics of movement and existing legal practice by states in one region may shed 
light on broader questions about the current and future role of international law in shaping 
this response. The contention that legal scholars working on this aspect of the law should 
reflect more carefully on the empirical framing of the assumed underlying problem is not 
new. In this regard, the present study merely adds new elements to existing scholarship on the 
implications of the empirical data on environmental threats and human mobility. However, it 
also makes a more ambitious claim, namely that discussion of the role of international law in 
this field cannot be divorced entirely from proper consideration of existing legal practice at 
the national level. In other words, legal scholars interested in how, in cross-border contexts, 
international law could or should address ‘environmentally displaced persons’, ‘climate 
refugees’ or ‘the disaster-displaced’ – to use only a few contemporary terms – cannot 
continue to discount national legal practice as if it were irrelevant. What, then, are the 
principal implications of this case study of the Americas for our understanding of 
international law development in response to this perceived legal problem? 
On the underlying empirical dynamics, beyond the much-cited risk posed by rising 
sea levels in the Pacific, the growing evidence base from the Americas confirms that 
international mobility in this region is already being shaped by sudden-onset events, such as 
hurricanes, storms, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and flooding, as well as slow-onset 
processes, such as desertification and droughts. It has been argued here that, although the 
concept of ‘disasters’ is a useful starting point for understanding how these events contribute 
to the movement of persons, a broader focus on the underlying ‘hazards’ and ‘hazardous 
events’ may better capture the wider ways in which these phenomena can shape mobility, 
even where a ‘disaster’ does not result at societal level. In tandem, contrary to assumptions in 
the legal literature that the resulting movement is an issue only for the global North, data 
from this region show that some of this movement also takes place to countries in the global 
South. As such, this study contends that the legal practice and perspectives of global South 
states need to be incorporated alongside those of states in the global North in considering the 
development of law in this field. Moreover, beyond a narrow focus on movement ‘pushed’ by 
hazards, this study of the Americas demonstrates how such hazards, in countries of 
destination and transit as well as countries of origin, impinge on international mobility issues 
in other legally-relevant ways. Indeed, the risk is that, if we continue to frame the issue as one 
of extending ‘international protection’ to persons fleeing disaster-affected countries, we lose 
sight of the fact that similar legal gaps in relation to travel, entry and stay also exist for non-
nationals whose mobility is affected by hazards in countries of destination and transit. We 
also risk stretching refugee law, and wider concepts of international protection, to breaking 
point. 
On the framing of the legal problem, it is true that international law only tangentially 
regulates the international mobility-related challenges of travel, entry and stay of non-
nationals in the context of environmental threats. However, the fact of a ‘gap’ in international 
law does not mean that no law exists. Nor does it imply that proposed solutions to the 
problem can start from a blank canvas. This study of the Americas instead shows many states 
in this region have long recognised the challenges involved and also developed legal 
responses at the national level to accommodate affected persons. At least for the Americas, 
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this body of legal practice robustly challenges the contention in much of the legal literature 
that national law can simply be dismissed as irrelevant or as comprised merely of isolated 
‘protection’ provisions in the national law of states in the global North. Rather, a broadly 
similar legal approach to these mobility challenges is evident in national laws across this 
region, including among states in the global South. On the one hand, this existing practice 
raises a question about the role of international law and its added value to the existing 
response in this region, especially in light of international efforts in some sub-regions to 
develop harmonised guidance on such legal practice. On the other hand, given that it is states 
that are the creators of international law, a better understanding of the ways in which they 
already see the pertinent challenges, and respond to them in law, offers an insight into how 
those existing views and practice might influence the development of international law in the 
future.  
In this respect, the study establishes that most states in the Americas treat the 
challenges principally as a matter of immigration law rather than international protection. 
This is not to say that the latter body of law is not applied where environmental events 
unleash persecution or violence, but simply that it is done by reference to the latter 
phenomena rather than the disasters themselves. In general, though, the travel, entry and stay 
of persons affected by environmental threats is resolved not by application of the law on 
international protection (or that on the environment) but by immigration law and cooperation 
with the state of origin. For persons with a link to the destination country, ordinary migration 
categories offer a pathway for mobility, and a criterion for differentiation among the wider 
universe of migrants, the importance of which is often overlooked in the legal literature. The 
fact that states have been prepared to flexibly apply these categories to ‘disaster’-affected 
persons, in contrast to the rigid application of refugee law, indicates how strongly states see 
immigration law as the appropriate medium of response. Even for those who lack such a link 
with the destination country, a surprisingly wide range of states have used exceptional 
migration categories in immigration law, and similar provisions for humanitarian discretion 
in national refugee law, to facilitate entry and stay for affected persons. In both cases, the 
pertinent criterion is usually that the individual is ‘seriously and directly affected’ by the 
disaster. Immigration law may be largely overlooked by the legal literature, since it is not 
well-established in international law, but, in practice, it represents the main framework for 
response by states in the Americas.  
What, then, of international law? This study shows that, at least in the Americas, the 
problem is not an absence of legal tools. Indeed, in this region, the basic elements of the 
approach in national law have quite a high degree of consistency. This raises the important 
question of whether similar legal practice can be discerned in other regions of the world. Yet, 
for the development of international law, even this discrete body of national legal practice in 
the Americas raises the prospect that these provisions provide evidence of emerging norms of 
‘regional’ custom,273 and they are already influencing policy at the global level. That 
consistency is seen also in how the existing national practice has been distilled and elaborated 
in soft law frameworks at the sub-regional level as a means to harmonise the approach in 
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participating states. Looking to the future, this suggests that grand proposals for new global 
treaties on international protection or environmental law to address the legal implications of 
such mobility are less likely to gain traction with states in this region than efforts to develop 
the existing approach in international immigration law at the regional or sub-regional levels. 
In some forums, incorporating elements of the current approach into free movement 
arrangements looks like a distinct possibility.274 Overall, then, it seems that international law 
may still have a role to play in shaping the response to international mobility linked to 
environmental factors. However, for better or worse, in the Americas and elsewhere too, its 
development seems more likely to build on existing state practice than on the flights of fancy 
of us international law scholars. After all, the law offers few truly blank canvases. 
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